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ABSTRACT

The on-farm production of switchgrass has been given considerable attention by farmers,
policymakers and others. However, because the switchgrass market is not developed yet, most
of the research only focuses on the switchgrass breakeven cost. The appropriate price combining
interests of both the biorefinery and the farmers, or the contract price, has not been given enough
attention.
Two types of contractual relationships are discussed in this thesis: Capacity Procurement
Contract (CPC, per acre contract) and Tonnage Contract (TC, per ton contract). The contract
prices of switchgrass under these two types of contracts are estimated in this analysis. Because
the land quality and soil type also affect the yield and average cost of switchgrass production and
corn production, the type of landscape also affects the contract price of switchgrass. Using west
Tennessee as a case study, contract prices under four types of landscapes are analyzed: (i) a welldrained level upland (WDLU), (ii) a well- to moderately well-drained floodplain (WDFP), (iii) a
moderate to somewhat poorly drained eroded sloping upland (MDSU), (iv) a poorly drained
floodplain (PDFP). This research suggests that the MDSU land is the top choice for the
biorefinery. Under the capacity procurement contract, the switchgrass contract price on MDSU
land is $474 per acre. Under the tonnage contract, the switchgrass contract price on MDSU land
is estimated to be $77 per ton. Compared to the capacity procurement contract, a tonnage
contract is preferred by the biorefinery because the tonnage contract has more post contract risk
advantage than the capacity procurement contract with regard to the unexpected change in
switchgrass yield.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

Biofuel has been in use in many countries around the world. For example, a high blend
of ethanol and gasoline has been in use in Brazil for more than 30 years. Bioethanol was broadly
introduced in Sweden in 2005 (Pacini and Silveira 2010). In the United States (US), concerns
about the high dependency on imported oil and the environmental costs of fossil fuels are the
main drivers of research on bioenergy (McLaughlin et al. 1999).
Farmers, policymakers and others have shown great interest in the on-farm production of
biomass for ethanol production (English et al. 2006). The Energy Independence and Security
Act of 2007 requires that 36 billion gallons of biofuel be produced from renewable sources
within the US by 2022. About 6% of US corn is used to produce approximately 1 billion gallons
of ethanol each year. However, this raises the ethical question with regard to the world shortage
of food. Moreover, considering the continuously increasing price of corn, it is unlikely that corn
can supply more than 2 billion to 2.5 billion gallons of ethanol annually in the future
(McLaughlin et al. 1999).
Switchgrass has been identified as the model biomass feedstock for the biofuel industry
to produce cellulosic ethanol based on the extensive research by the Bioenergy Feedstock
Development Program at the Oak Ridge National Laboratory (McLaughlin et al. 1999; Fuentes
and Taliaferro 2002; Epplin et al. 2007). It is a warm season, perennial grass that can grow to
more than 2.75 meters in height and its rooting system can extend up to 3 meters in depth
(Jensen et al. 2007). Switchgrass has a yield of 13.5-17.9 Mg per hector or 6-8 short tons per
acre in the southeastern US (Bouton 2002; Maposse et al. 1995). It can be planted in May
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through early June and harvested annually using regular hay equipment (Jensen et al. 2007).
Switchgrass has the greatest potential for being grown in the US among all biomass alternatives.
Perlack et al. (2005) reported that 55 million acres of cropland, idle cropland, and cropland
pasture could be seeded to produce switchgrass. English et al. (2006) also concluded that
switchgrass could be planted on more than 100 million US acres with some incentives. The
production costs of growing switchgrass in specific regions in the US are lower than those of
other herbaceous crops (Khanna et al. 2008). Compared to traditional food crops such as corn
and soybeans, switchgrass has many advantages. It grows on many soil types, including
marginal lands not economically viable to grow traditional crops (Fewell et al. 2011), and only
requires moderate inputs. For example, it is well adapted to grow on a large portion of the US
land with low fertilizer applications and high resistance to naturally occurring pests and diseases
(Bransby 1998). Switchgrass also helps to improve water quality and wildlife habitat (Duffy and
Nanhou 2001), and protects soil from being eroded.
However, the market for switchgrass is not well developed yet (Fewell et al. 2011). Risk
and uncertainty in switchgrass production and marketing are the major concerns for farmers
when deciding whether to grow switchgrass. A contractual relationship with biorefineries
specifying price, harvest timing, storage, and other requirements in contract clauses is welcome
by farmers (Fewell et al. 2011). Meanwhile, a long-term production and harvest contract with an
individual farmer can also be used by the biorefinery to reduce the switchgrass procurement risk
(Epplin et al. 2007). Moreover, the high cost of constructing a production facility encourages the
biorefinery to use contracts to induce farmers to supply sufficient feedstocks that will keep the
plant operating at capacity (Larson et al. 2008).
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Figure 1 gives a basic description of determining the switchgrass contract price between
the biorefinery and the farmers. The biorefinery represents the demand side for the switchgrass,
while the farmers represent the supply side of the switchgrass. The biorefinery’s profit is mainly
from producing and selling ethanol1. Therefore, the revenue from ethanol sales is directly related
to the ethanol market price and total ethanol output level. On the other hand, the costs of
producing ethanol center on four main components: switchgrass procurement costs, switchgrass
transportation cost, switchgrass storage cost, and biorefinery plant operating and maintenance
cost. The conversion rate which is the amount (e.g. gallons) of ethanol produced from each ton
of switchgrass measures the production efficiency in ethanol production.
The farmers can select whether to use their land to produce switchgrass or use the land as
perhaps pasture for beef cattle or a traditional food crop, such as corn. If they decide to sign a
contract and produce switchgrass, their profit will be determined by the switchgrass contract
price, switchgrass yield, and the production costs. To attract farmers to grow switchgrass, the
biorefinery must pay farmers enough to cover the explicit switchgrass production cost such as
seed cost and fertilizer cost, and be high enough to cover the farmer’s opportunity cost of
producing switchgrass, or the expected profit from alternative land use. However, the
biorefinery, a profit-maximizer itself, will try to keep the purchasing price, which is an input cost
to the biorefinery, as low as possible.

1

Under the Renewable Fuel Standard (RFS) each biorefinery has a quota for ethanol use. Biorefineries unable to
meet their quota can purchase RINs (renewable identiﬁcation numbers) from others who exceed their quota. A RIN
is a 38-character code attached to a gallon of ethanol. Therefore, the biorefinery may also obtain profit from trading
the RINs. The profit from trading RINs is not considered in this study.
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Figure 1

Switchgrass Supply/Demand Contract

Research Objectives
Using west Tennessee as a case study, the research objectives are:
1. Determine the contract price paid to the farmer under a Capacity Procurement Contract
(CPC)2 where the biorefinery pays a price for each acre of land allocated to switchgrass
production.
2. Determine the contract price paid to the farmer under a Tonnage Contract (TC) where the
biorefinery pays a price for each ton of switchgrass harvested.
2

Capacity Procurement Contract is often referred to as Acreage Contract.
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3. Determine the impact of land type on the contract price for both contract options.
4. Analyze the biorefinery’s profit under each contract and different land types.
5. Conduct a sensitivity analysis on pre contract prices and on profits post contract.
6. Analyze contracts to determine the type contract that would be preferred by the biorefinery.

5

CHAPTER II
LITERATURE REVIEW

The literature review reflects the major components of Figure 1: ethanol production,
switchgrass production, and contracts.

2.1

Ethanol Production

2.1.1 Ethanol Production Process
Switchgrass is classified as a lignocellulosic crop because it is primarily the cell walls
that are digested to form sugars which can subsequently be fermented to produce liquid fuels
(Wyman 1993; McLaughlin et al. 1999). Three major components of switchgrass are: cellulose
(30-50%), hemicellulose (15-35%), and lignin (10-30%) (Carolan et al. 2007). Cellulose is a
polymer of glucose, and hemicellulose is a polymer of five and six carbon sugars, mostly xylose.
Both cellulose and hemicellulose can be converted to produce ethanol. Lignin cannot contribute
to ethanol production. The high content of cellulose and hemicellulose (70%-90% in total)
makes switchgrass the most promising feedstock for producing ethanol.
A thermo-chemical process and a biochemical process are the two ways used to convert
biomass into biofuels. The thermo-chemical process is mainly used for the production of
Fischer-Tropsch diesel fuel and hydrogen; biochemical processing, in contrast, is considered to
be the most suitable method for converting biomass into ethanol (Carolan et al. 2007). In
biochemical processing, pretreatment of switchgrass is needed to increase the surface area and
make it more accessible to enzyme hydrolysis. Pretreated biomass then undergoes a hydrolysis
6

process to depolymerize the cellulose and hemicellulose into sugars. Next, enzymes are used to
convert the sugars into ethanol through fermentation (Sun and Cheng 2002). Finally, the ethanol
product is obtained through a recovery process (Carolan et al. 2007).

2.1.2 Conversion Rate
Conversion rate is usually used to determine the efficiency of producing ethanol using
switchgrass as the feedstock. A higher conversion rate means that the biorefinery can produce
more ethanol with a fixed amount of switchgrass or it needs less switchgrass to produce a certain
amount of ethanol. Conversion rate is restricted by the technology employed by the biorefinery.
For example, the conversion rate will be different between a thermo-chemical and a biochemical
process. Various conversion rates are assumed in current literature. Three conversion rates, 60,
80, and 100 gallons of ethanol per ton of switchgrass, are assumed in Haque and Epplin (2012)
with regard to a small, medium and large plant size biorefinery accordingly. The conversion rate
was assumed to be 82.69 gallons per ton in Schmer et al. (2008). Humbird et al. (2011) reported
the conversion rate to be 79.09 gallons per ton which is close to the conversion rate of a medium
sized biorefinery (80.05 gallons per ton) used in Haque and Epplin (2012). Sendich et al (2008)
and Wu et al. (2010) estimated the conversion rate to be 69.99 gallons per ton. Eggeman and
Elander (2005) reported the conversion rate to be 64.95 gallons of ethanol out of one ton of
switchgrass.

2.1.3 Ethanol Production Cost and Breakeven Price
Because the biomass market has not been well developed yet, the analysis of market price
for ethanol produced from biomass is limited. Most research on ethanol price has focused on the
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estimation of the biorefinery production cost, or ethanol breakeven price. Plant operation and
maintenance cost includes labor cost, utilities expenses, chemical cost, taxes, repair cost, and
investments. The plant operation and maintenance cost is assumed to be $0.75 per gallon
(Haque and Epplin 2012).
The estimated total cost to produce cellulosic ethanol ranges from $0.79 to $4.73 per
gallon (Haque and Epplin 2012). The average cost estimations differ due to the assumptions of
ethanol conversion rate, biorefinery investment cost, switchgrass cost as the feedstock, the
commercial scale of operation, and whether storage and transportation costs were considered to
be costs to the biorefinery.
Wyman (2007) indicated that total production cost per gallon of ethanol varied from
$0.52 to $0.64, and the $0.12 variability was due entirely to changes in ethanol yield per ton of
switchgrass. The US Department of Energy estimated that the cost of producing ethanol would
be $1.02 per gallon (Aden et al. 2002; Goldemberg 2007; Tyner 2008). The study by
Goldemberg (2007) showed the total ethanol production cost was $1.07 per gallon. Tyner (2008)
estimated the total cost of ethanol would be $1.12 per gallon. The highest ethanol breakeven
price was estimated by Haque and Epplin (2012) ranging from $0.44 to $0.72 per liter ($1.67$2.73 per gallon) conditioned on different biorefinery plant sizes and ethanol conversion rate
assumptions. The main difference in these estimations depended on whether storage and
transportation costs were considered to be costs to the biorefinery.
Based on a sample of 4,825 monthly reports from 232 fueling stations in Minnesota
between October 1997 and November 2006, the retail ethanol price ranged from $0.74 to $2.96
per gallon, with mean $1.74 per gallon and standard deviation $0.35 per gallon, while the range
of the wholesale ethanol price was larger: ranging from $0.45to $3.03 per gallon, with a lower
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mean $1.27 and higher standard deviation $0.56 in 2006 dollars (Anderson 2010). Both the
retail and wholesale average price of ethanol are slightly higher than the estimated breakeven
prices, indicating there is only a little profit margin for biorefineries. The biorefinery may be
faced with a perfectly competitive ethanol market.

2.1.4 Ethanol Futures Pricing
One of the main difficulties in an empirical study of ethanol price is that the spot market
price is quite uncertain. The daily or weekly spot price is not only hard to observe directly, but
also varies among different geographic regions, which makes the spot price report of ethanol
unreliable. In contrast, the futures contracts are better organized and standardized, and traded
actively in the exchanges. Therefore, the futures prices of ethanol provide the guidelines for the
ethanol price evaluation. In fact, the corresponding prices of ethanol futures contracts closest to
maturity are often used as a proxy for the spot price (Schwartz 1997). Brennan and Schwartz
(1985) derived a mathematical relationship between the futures prices and spot prices using a
stochastic model to describe the movement of commodity spot prices. Moreover, Gibson and
Schwartz (1990) built a similar model considering both the spot price movement and the benefits
from holding a futures contract, or instantaneous convenient yield, to derive the functional
relationship between the futures price and the spot price. These futures pricing formulas
provided the theoretical basis for applying empirical analysis to estimate and to project
commodity spot prices. Applying the Kalman filter method, Schwartz (1997) found that simply
modeling the commodity spot price movement without considering the instantaneous
convenience yield could not describe the commodity futures price movement very well.
Moreover, Schwartz and Smith (2000) described a model by splitting the spot price into two
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components: a short-term price deviation component and a long-term equilibrium price
component. The Kalman filter was also used in Schwartz and Smith (2000) to estimate and to
forecast the unobservable commodity spot prices. The detailed futures pricing techniques can be
found in Schreve (2004) and Duffie (2001). A summary of the Kalman filter method is
demonstrated in Appendix A.33.

2.2

Switchgrass Production

2.2.1 Switchgrass Yield
The planting dates of switchgrass range from late-April to mid-June. In the first year,
about 25% of switchgrass will not survive the winter of that year. In the second year, the
switchgrass that failed to survive will be replaced or reseeded (Khanna et al. 2008). As a
perennial crop, switchgrass can be harvested annually. About 67% of the maximum yield of
switchgrass will be harvested in the second year (Khanna et al. 2008). From the third year
onwards, the yields remain constant through the remaining life of the crop. Mooney et al. (2009)
also reported the first and second-year switchgrass yields would be 14% and 60% of third-year
yields on average. Moreover, switchgrass can be harvested as a one- or two-cut system (Garland
2008). There would be an 8% increase in the yield with two-cut management for switchgrass
(Alamo) compared to the one-cut management (Fike et al. 2007). When cut twice a year, the
first cutting would occur when switchgrass is in late boot to very early seedhead emergence in

3

More formal and complete discussions on Kalman filter were demonstrated in Harvey (1989) (Chapter 3),
Hamilton (1994) (Chapter 13), Brockwell and Davis (2002) (Chapter 8), Durbin and Koopman (2012) (Chapter 2
and 4), and West and Harrison (1997).
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late-June or early-July; the second cutting would be in November or the first killing frost,
whichever comes earlier (Garland 2008).
The yield of switchgrass production also varies among different production
environments. The southeastern United States is considered a likely region to produce
switchgrass because growing seasons are longer and the yield for traditional crops is lower
compared to other regions (Boyer et al. 2012; Dicks et al. 2009; English et al. 2006; Mooney et
al. 2009). Estimated across the lifespan of switchgrass, the yield per acre in the southern US is
considered to be greater than that in the northern states (McLaughlin and Kszos 2005). Walsh et
al. (2003) estimated that on the land currently planting traditional crops, the average yield of
switchgrass in the southeast US was 5.49 tons per acre with a range from 3.40 to 6.47 tons per
acre; however, the average yield was 3.48 tons per acre in the northern Plains ranging from 2.01
to 5.49 tons per acre. Duffy (2007) calculated the average yield level of switchgrass was 4 tons
per acre in Iowa. Khanna et al. (2008) estimated the yield of switchgrass in Illinois was 4.20
tons per acre. In contrast, the switchgrass estimations in southern states were higher. Fike et al.
(2006) reported an average yield of 5.45 tons per acre in West Tennessee. McLaughlin and
Kszos (2005) reported the average yield in Tennessee was 6.16 tons per acre with the best oneyear yield at 12.22 tons per acre. Muir et al. (2001) reported an average yield of 5.97 tons per
acre in Texas. Epplin et al. (2007) reported that the average annual yield of switchgrass in
Oklahoma was 6.06 tons per acre.
Mooney et al. (2009) reported that the yield of switchgrass was affected by the land
quality. Based on a 3-year multilocation experiment at Milan, TN, they estimated the welldrained upland location suitable for row crops had the highest yield of 7.89 tons per acre and the
poorly drained flood plain location had the lowest yield of 3.79 tons per acre. Similar to Mooney

11

et al. (2009), research in west Tennessee during a seven-year period (2005-2011) was conducted
by Boyer et al. (2012) on four landscapes: (i) a well-drained level upland (WDLU), (ii) a well- to
moderately well-drained floodplain (WDFP), (iii) a moderate to somewhat poorly drained eroded
sloping upland (MDSU), (iv) a poorly drained floodplain (PDFP). The WDLU and WDFP
landscapes were well suited for row crop production in Tennessee, while the MDSU and PDFP
landscapes represented the marginal land for crop production in Tennessee (Boyer et al. 2012).
During this longer time period compared to Mooney et al (2009), the average yields of
switchgrass calculated by Boyer et al. (2012) across these seven years from these four types of
landscapes (WDLU, WDFP, MDSU, and PDFP) were 7.19, 7.57, 7.86, and 7.17 tons per acre
respectively.

2.2.2 Switchgrass Production Costs and Breakeven Price
Much of the analysis of the economic potential for switchgrass has focused on estimating
switchgrass production costs (Jensen et al. 2007). Mooney et al. (2009) analyzed the production
costs based on the University of Tennessee Extension switchgrass production budget including
the costs involved in establishment, maintenance and harvest stages. Maintenance cost included
capital recovery cost, machinery repair and maintenance cost, fuel and lube cost, taxes, insurance
expenses and housing cost, assuming the use of 150-hp tractors to power farm implements, labor
at $8.50 per hour, a diesel fuel price of $2.12 per gallon, and a nominal interest rate of 8%.
Establishment cost was limited to the first year of production and included machinery and labor
time, seed, herbicide, fertilizer, and interest on operating costs. Seed price was $20 per pound of
pure live seed, while 98.8 pounds of P2O5 and 197.8 pounds of K 2O were used as nutrients per
acre at a price of $0.32 and $0.22 per pound accordingly (Garland 2008). Harvest cost was
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calculated as a function of yield for switchgrass harvested in large round bales (1500 pounds per
bale) and included machinery and labor costs, bale twine cost and interest on variable operating
cost. The total harvest cost varied depending on the yield of the switchgrass. Moreover, total
switchgrass production cost in the first year differed from costs in subsequent years, because the
cost of land preparation and planting to establish the crop occurred in the first year. In the
second year, reseeding or replanting costs would occur from replacing plants that did not survive
the first winter (Khanna et al. 2008). In the subsequent years, the maintenance cost and harvest
cost were assumed to be constant through the remaining lifespan of switchgrass.
Breakeven price is commonly analyzed in evaluating the economic potential of
switchgrass. The farm-gate breakeven price is the price per ton of switchgrass needed to offset
all costs of production incurred over the lifetime of the crop discounted to current prices divided
by the discounted value of successive yields (Khanna et al. 2008). Farm-gate price does not
consider any other costs beyond harvest and storage of switchgrass bales at field edge. Due to
the different weather and land conditions and different assumptions made on bale types and
storage methods, the average cost of producing switchgrass varies among different regions, and
therefore the breakeven price differs accordingly. Generally speaking, the production of
switchgrass in the Southeastern US has an advantage compared to the northern US latitudes.
Duffy (2007) calculated the breakeven price for switchgrass to be $82.23 per ton in Iowa by
assuming the rectangular bales and indoor storage. Khanna et al. (2008) estimated a farm-gate
breakeven price for switchgrass to be $88.90 per ton in Illinois. Perrin et al (2008) estimated the
average of farm-gate breakeven prices in central Plains at $53.52 per ton. In contrast, the
breakeven price for switchgrass ranged from $42.90 to $62.23 per ton in the southeastern US
depending on the land conditions (Mooney et al. 2009). Epplin et al. (2007) reported a unit
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production cost of switchgrass for the southern states to be $50.80 per ton without considering
the costs beyond harvest. Based on the net present value (NPV) approach, Walsh et al. (2003)
used the POLYSYS4 model to estimate the farm-gate price of bioenergy crops based on the
competition with alternative usage of croplands. Through the modeling of the switchgrass
supply schedule and the demand schedule, the farm-gate price of switchgrass was estimated to be
$49.91 per dry ton.
Contrary to the popular belief, few farmland acres are not used in productive activities.
Therefore, switchgrass production will require some shift in traditional cropland use to “biofuel
feedstocks” (Dicks et al. 2009). The competition of bioenergy crops with high-value crops in
land usage determines the opportunity cost of alternative land uses (Walsh et al. 2003; Mooney
et al. 2009), that is, the profits foregone from the most profitable alternative use of the land that
is converted to a perennial grass (Khanna et al. 2008). A survey conducted by Jensen et al.
(2007) revealed that farmers with higher net farm incomes per acre were willing to convert
smaller shares of their farmland to switchgrass. Those with higher off-farm incomes were
willing to convert more acres. The research done in Illinois assumed that corn and soybean were
the two dominant row crops grown in rotation with each other as the alternative for switchgrass
(Khanna et al. 2008). The breakeven price of switchgrass was calculated to be $90 per dry ton
after including the opportunity cost of land compared to $65 per ton without including the
opportunity cost of land (Khanna et al. 2008).

4

POLYSYS is an agricultural policy simulation model of the U.S. agricultural sector. It includes national demand,
regional supply, livestock and aggregate income modules. POLYSYS model is used to simulate impacts to the U.S.
agricultural sector resulting from changes in policy, economics, or resource conditions (Walsh et al. 2003).
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2.2.3 Switchgrass Transportation and Storage
After being harvested, the feedstocks, e.g. switchgrass, need to be transported to the
biorefinery and stored. Whether the storage and transportation cost should be shouldered by the
biorefinery or by the farmers depends on the specification of their contracts. But due to the
equipment-intensive enterprise nature of transportation and storage, it is usually assumed to be
the biorefinery which shoulders the transportation and storage tasks (Cundiff and Marsh 1996).
The transportation cost includes loading cost, labor cost, fuel cost, and machinery cost. The cost
of hauling switchgrass can be minimized through maximizing the dry matter in every truckload
(Cundiff and Grisso 2008). Larson et al. (2005) indicated that the cost of transportation was $10
per dry ton. Perrin et al. (2008) reported that the average cost of transporting round bales to a
refinery was about $13 per ton. Other research maintained that the average transportation cost
was affected by the distance shipped from the farm to the biorefinery. Walsh et al. (1998)
estimated the transportation cost ranged from $5 per dry ton to $8 per dry ton within a 25 mile
transport distance. Duffy and Nanhou (2001) claimed that the estimated transportation costs
were about $0.10 per dry ton per mile for hauling distances of less than 50 miles and the typical
transportation costs were expected to be between $5 and $10 per dry ton for a distance less than
75 miles. Duffy (2007) estimated that the transportation cost was $6.10 per ton within a 5-mile
trip, and the transportation cost increased to $8.65 per ton within a 30-mile trip.
The exposure of switchgrass bales to rain, ultraviolet rays and humidity result in the dry
matter loss of switchgrass during the storage process (Sanderson et al. 1997). The cost of storing
includes not only the cost for the facilities used, but also the dry matter loss associated with
various storage methods (Duffy 2007). The storage cost also varies with regard to bale types.
Rectangular bales have the cost advantage in transportation and saving space in storage
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compared to round bales, but the dry matter loss is greater using square bales than using covered
round bales (English et al. 2008). Large round bales have the advantage of shedding water
which is especially needed in the southern U.S. due to the year-round precipitation (Larson et al.
2005). Cundiff and Marsh (1996) estimated the cost for storing round switchgrass bales without
a tarp was $3.20 per dry ton. Wang et al. (2009) determined that the cost of storage for a round
bale was $3.83 per dry ton. The difference was whether the round bales were wrapped with
plastic tarp or not. Duffy (2007) estimated that the storage cost per ton for square bales (3  4  8
feet, with a weight of 950 pounds) was $16.67 if stored in an enclosed building.

2.3

Contracts

An extensive literature examines the reason why an agricultural producer might prefer a
marketing or production contract to a spot market. Asset specificity, which is the degree of an
asset can be used to other purposes, and uncertainty are the key motivators for contract
application (Jensen et al. 2007). The ownership of a highly specialized asset can leave a party
vulnerable in negotiations which may cause the owner prefer a contract to reduce the risks
involved (Jensen et al. 2011). Moreover, a greater uncertainty in price implies a greater risk
from opportunistic behavior. Thus, a contract will limit the exposure to environmental (e.g.
supply, demand, and price) uncertainty (Franken et al. 2009).
Contracts are widely used in traditional agricultural sectors to reduce the risk and
uncertainty in production and marketing. With the level of vertical integration in agricultural
markets growing over the last decade, production contracts have been more prevalent in
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livestock and specialty grains markets because of the risk in production and procurement in spot
markets (Goodhue 2000; Ginder et al. 2000). Principal-agent5 theory was used in Goodhue
(2000) to model production contracts in the broiler industry. The study found that contracts
outlining different compensation schemes were optimal responses to risk aversion. A transaction
cost approach, used to examine specialty crop contracts in Canada, found that market power on
the buyers’ side led to reduced competition in the contract’s compensation terms (Weleschuk and
Kerr 1995). The standard marketing contract (or bushel contract) and the acreage contract in
specialty grain production were also analyzed in Paulson and Babcock (2007). By modeling the
production uncertainty in switchgrass and corn, the result indicated that bushel contract structure
Pareto dominated the optimal acreage contract (Paulson and Babcock 2007).
Various studies have found farm characteristics and farmer demographics have an impact
on farmers’ choice on whether or not to use a contract. For example, a larger farm size has a
positive impact on contracting (Jensen et al. 2011; Dong et al. 2008; Edleman 2006). The
diversification of the farm is negatively related with contracting (Davis and Gillespie 2007;
Dong et al. 2008) due to the reason that diversification can reduce the risk. Jensen et al. (2011)
gave the detailed description in current literature with regard to the farm characteristic and
farmer demographic impacts on the selection of contracting.
Because the market for switchgrass has not been well-developed, the risks of producing
and procuring switchgrass also play a major role for farmers and the biorefinery respectively.
Given the high cost of constructing a production facility, the biorefinery will have an incentive to
provide the farmers a contract to guarantee a sufficient feedstock to keep the plant operating at
capacity (Larson et al. 2008). Jensen et al. (2011) suggested that the farmers are willing to grow

5

The principal–agent problem concerns the difficulties in motivating one party (the ‘agent’) to act on behalf of
another (the ‘principal’) due to information imperfection.

17

switchgrass under a contract. This willingness was greater among the farmers who farmed more
lands, had facilities in which they could store switchgrass and had substantial off-farm income.
The contract can also reduce the risk and uncertainty faced by the farmers in switchgrass
marketing. Yang et al. (2012) revealed that for a given level of risk aversion, farmers with low
land quality were more willing to sign contracts with a biorefinery to produce bioenergy crops
due to the cost of foregoing row crop production. The higher the risk level of the farmers, the
more likely they will contract with biorefineries (Yang et al. 2012). Therefore, a contractual
arrangement is beneficial to both farmers and the biorefinery. A guaranteed price at which the
switchgrass is sold to the biorefinery needs to be specified in the contract (Covert and English
2012). From the biorefinery’s perspective, the guaranteed price facilitates the biorefinery
making future predictions and calculations regarding the price of ethanol produced. From a
farmer’s perspective, a contract minimizes the risk and uncertainty in switchgrass production and
marketing, especially when the switchgrass market is under development. Yang et al. (2012)
also suggested that farmers’ land allocation decisions are dependent on both their individual land
quality and risk preferences. A farmer with low land quality and high degree of risk aversion
will choose to lease their land for biomass production. A farmer with low land quality and low
risk aversion will choose to grow the energy crop under a profit sharing contract instead of a
fixed price contract.
A contract also needs to specify the lifespan of the contract for farmers and the
biorefinery. A ten-year production lifespan is usually used in literature (Duffy 2007; Khanna et
al. 2008). Perrin et al. (2008) maintained that the average cost of switchgrass production over
ten years ($53.61 per ton) was lower than the average cost over five years ($59.75 per ton) based
on their experience in North Dakota, South Dakota and Nebraska. Mooney et al. (2009) reported
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the yield and breakeven prices of switchgrass for both a 5-year and 10-year contract lifespan and
concluded that the breakeven price for a 5-year contract is higher than for a 10-year contract.
The contract beyond five years may be subject to more production risk and uncertainty in future
price fluctuations and does not take full consideration of the possibility of switchgrass seed
improvement.
A detailed study on biomass contract structures with regard to the potential of a West
Tennessee grain farm to supply lignocellulosic biomass to a biorefinery was conducted by
Larson et al. (2008). Four potential types of contracts offering different levels of biomass price,
yield, and production risk-sharing between farmers and biorefineries were analyzed: the spot
market contract, the standard marketing contract, the acreage contract, and the gross revenue
contract (Larson et al. 2008). Their research evaluated the ability and willingness of farmers to
provide lignocellulosic biomass feedstocks under risk given the farmers’ on-farm situation and
potential contractual arrangements with user facilities (Larson et al. 2008). In a spot market
contract, biomass was priced yearly on its current energy equivalent value as a substitute for
gasoline. Farmers bore all the output price, yield, and production risk from biomass production
in this contract. In a standard marketing contract, biomass was sold at the equivalent spot market
price with a penalty for underage or excess production. Larson et al. (2005) analyzed the risk
management benefits of a standard marketing contract. It was shown in Larson et al (2008) that
a portion of risk was shifted from farmers to the biorefinery. An acreage contract guaranteed a
fixed annual price for the actual biomass produced on the contracted acreages, and the
biorefinery had to buy all the yield of the switchgrass annually. All price risks were born by the
biorefinery while farmers still incurred all yield and production cost risks. In contrast,
guaranteed annual gross revenue per acre over the life of the contract was provided in a gross
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revenue contract (Larson et al. 2008). Larson et al. (2008) pointed out that the acreage and gross
revenue contracts were more effective at inducing maximum farm biomass production at lower
contract prices than the standard contract for a risk neutral decision maker.
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CHAPTER III
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

3.1

The Biorefinery

3.1.1 Ethanol Production
The production function of ethanol is subject to the technology a biorefinery owns to
produce ethanol using switchgrass as a feedstock. More specifically, assume the conversion rate
from switchgrass to ethanol is  , which means the biorefinery will produce  units (e.g.
gallons) of ethanol using one unit (e.g. ton) of switchgrass as feedstock; then the production
function of the biorefinery is a linear function to the amount of switchgrass used as input, that is,

Y   Qt (L)

(1)

where Y is the quantity of ethanol produced, and Qt (L) the amount of switchgrass produced with
units (e.g. acres) of land used as the feedstock in year t. The marginal production in equation
(1) is constant which is different from the usual assumption of diminishing marginal returns.
However, the conversion rate  in equation (1) can be explained as the average conversion rate
when the biorefinery uses switchgrass to produce ethanol. It represents the average production
efficiency in a biorefinery’s production process.

3.1.2 Biorefinery’s Profit
Considering the heterogeneity among farmers, e.g. farmers locate in different counties or
have different land fertility levels (Jensen et al. 2007), the biorefinery can try to sign a contract
with each farmer willing to grow switchgrass. In each contract, switchgrass price is specified
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clearly with other contract clauses. Through a price discrimination strategy, the biorefinery can
take advantage of the heterogeneity among farmers, and achieve the greatest profit level.
All costs apart from the costs of purchasing, storing and transporting switchgrass, such as
labor cost, biorefinery maintenance cost, and monitoring cost, are assumed to be at a fixed level
held by the biorefinery. The biorefinery has the capacity to process all the switchgrass. Assume
the total expenditure on switchgrass procurement is SW. Dry matter loss is not considered; the
amount of switchgrass stored and delivered should be equal to the amount of switchgrass
harvested. The total cost of producing ethanol from switchgrass is the summation of switchgrass
procurement cost SW, storage cost, transportation cost, and the operating and maintenance cost.
When the ethanol spot market is perfectly competitive, or the biorefinery is a price-taker in
ethanol market, the revenue of selling ethanol in spot market equals the ethanol spot price S(t)
multiplied by ethanol output level Y, which is S(t)Y. So the biorefinery’s profit at time t can be
determined by subtracting total costs of ethanol production from the total revenue of ethanol
sales, that is,

 t  S (t )Y  SW  OMC  Y  s Qt ( L)  m Qt ( L)

(2)

where OMC is the average plant operating and maintenance cost, s is the storage cost per ton of
switchgrass stored/harvested and m is the transportation cost per ton of switchgrass
transported/harvested. By substituting equation (1) into equation (2), the profit equation can be
rewritten as:
(3)

 t  S (t )  OMC Qt ( L)  SW  s Qt ( L)  m Qt ( L)
The biorefinery should determine the contract price based on the maximization of the

expected value of the future’s discounted profit within the full contract lifespan. The reason that
the expected value needs to be considered by the biorefinery is that though the biorefinery’s
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production condition may not have significant changes during the contract lifespan (therefore the
costs may stay constant), the ethanol spot price will not be the same as the price when the
contract is signed. Therefore the biorefinery’s profit in the future is subject to the future ethanol
spot market conditions, which makes it necessary to project the future profit level when it tries to
enter a contract specifying the input procurement in the future. Assuming the contract lasts T
years and the switchgrass is harvested once a year, by continuously discounting all the future net
cash inflow/profit back into the initial time t  0 , the continuous-time present value is:
(4)

E   t e rt dt  E   S (t )  OMC   s  m Qt ( L)  SW e rt dt
T

T

0

0

where r is the discount factor. Equation (4) gives the overall discounted profit level the
biorefinery can achieve during a contract lifespan of T by signing a switchgrass procurement
contract with a farmer.

3.1.3 Ethanol Price
3.1.3.1

Ethanol Valuation Model
Often, the daily or weekly spot prices of ethanol are hard to obtain, especially when one

tries to collect the historical data. The spot market price also varies among different counties and
states which makes it very uncertain. The same commodity’s futures contract price is often
chosen to be the proxy for the spot price. A standard model built in Schwartz (1997) described
the functional relationship between the futures price and the spot price of different commodities.
The model in Schwartz (1997) and its empirical application can be found in Appendix A.1.
Compared to the model described in Schwartz (1997), Schwartz and Smith (2000)
developed a simpler and more intuitive model by splitting the spot price into two components:
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the long-run equilibrium price component and the short-run price deviation component. The
long-run equilibrium price components describe the “fair value” of the commodity based on the
current demand and supply conditions. However, the spot price is usually not equal to the
equilibrium price. There is a difference between the spot price and the equilibrium price in most
cases, which is the short-run price deviation component. Moreover, it has been shown that the
model in Schwartz and Smith (2000) is equivalent to the model described in Schwartz (1997),
but the parameters to be estimated are fewer in Schwartz and Smith (2000) model. In this thesis,
the Schwartz and Smith (2000) model is used to describe the price movement of ethanol due to
its parsimonious property in parameter estimation.
In this model, the Efficient Market Hypothesis is adopted, which means that the futures
market efficiently incorporates all public information. All the information obtained by the
public, including individual investors and researchers, has already been incorporated in the
futures price. For example, if an oil shortage has been expected by the public, the futures price
of ethanol will increase based on the expectation of high ethanol demand in the future.
Let S t denote the spot price of ethanol at time t. Assume that the spot price of ethanol
can be decomposed into two components: the long-run equilibrium price component  t and the
short-term deviation component  t , which is,
(5)

log( St )   t  t
Moreover, the short-term deviation is assumed to follow an Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process6

with mean reverting towards zero, which can be shown in a total derivative function:
(6)

d t  t dt   1dz1

and the equilibrium price level is assumed to follow a Brownian motion process
6

In an Ornstein–Uhlenbeck process, , satisfies the following stochastic differential equation:
, where
denotes the Wiener process (or Brownian motion).
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(

)

(7)

dt  dt   2 dz2

where dz1 and dz 2 are the increments of a standard Brownian motion process7. Assume that the
short-term deviation and equilibrium price are correlated with
(8)

dz1dz2  dt

Equation (6) shows a negative relationship between the change in deviation and the deviation
level. It means that when the short-term deviation is increasing, the speed of the deviation
change will decrease until the deviation disappears. This inverse relationship is the “meanreverting” property. In other words, the mean-reverting property in equation (6) shows that there
is an inner force that will pull the spot price towards the equilibrium price level, though they
seldom will be the same. The increment dz1 describes the unexpected change in the price
deviation which is subject to some unforeseeable random events. Sometimes some events will
push the spot price away from the equilibrium level while some events will pull the spot price
closer to the equilibrium level. Parameter  in equation (6) describes the rate at which the shortterm deviations are expected to disappear. Different from equation (6), equation (7) assumes that
there is a trend in the equilibrium price movement with a rate  though the equilibrium price is
still subject to the random change dz 2 . Variables  1 and  2 describe the volatility of the
random effects in both the short-run deviation and long-run equilibrium respectively, and the
random effects are correlated with a coefficient  .
Under the assumptions mentioned in equations (5), (6), (7), and (8), it can be shown that

 t and  t are jointly normally distributed with the mean vector (Appendix A.2):

7

) be a probability space. For each
Let (
, Brownian motion is a continuous function ( ) depending on
( ) ( )
that satisfies: (1) ( )
; (2) for all
, the increments ( )
( )
( )
(
) are independent, and (3) each of these increments is normally distributed with
)
( ))
)
( ))
( (
( (
(Shreve 2004).
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(9)

E t

t   et 0  0  t 



which means that the expected value of the short-run price deviation component,  t , is e t 0 and
the expected value of long-run equilibrium price component,  t , is 0  t . Parameters  0 and

 0 stand for the current short-run price deviation component level and long-run equilibrium price
component level. As can be seen from equation (9), the expectation of short-run price deviation
follows an exponential path with respect to time, which is faster than the change in the
expectation of long-run equilibrium price which follows a linear path along with time.
Moreover, the variance-covariance matrix of  t and  t can be written as

(10)

2

2t  1
(
1

e
)

2
vcov  t ,  t   
t 1 2
(1  e )



(1  e t )

1 2 
 

 22t




which means that the variances of the short-run price deviation component,  t , and the long-run
equilibrium price component,  t , are (1  e 2t )

 12
and  22t . Therefore, the variance of long-run
2

equilibrium price increases with time which shows that the forecasted price will be less accurate
in the future. The covariance of short-run price deviation component and the long-run
equilibrium price component is (1  e t )

1 2
.


Given the current level of short-run price deviation and long-run equilibrium price
components, though they are hypothetical values,  0 and  0 , the log of the ethanol spot price is
then normally distributed with the mean and variance:
(11)

Elog( St )  et 0  0  t

and
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var(log( St ))  (1  e 2t )

(12)

 12
 
  22t  2(1  e t ) 1 2
2


Equations (11) and (12) can be derived directly from equation (5) in which log( St ) is defined to
be the summation of short-run price deviation component  t and long-run equilibrium price
component  t . The ethanol spot price is therefore log-normally distributed with the expected
price given by
E ( St )  exp( E (log( St )) 

(13)

1
var(log( St )))
2

or
(14)

1
2
  
log( E ( St ))  e t 0   0  t   (1  e 2t ) 1   22t  2(1  e t ) 1 2 
2
2
 

If the forecast horizon increases ( t   ) and  is positive, the log of the expected spot price
can be simplified as
(15)

log( E ( St ))  ( 0 

 12 1 2 
1 

)      22 t
4

2 


which means that the expected future ethanol spot price follows an exponential time path.
Under the risk-neutral valuation paradigm, the risk-neutral stochastic process is needed to
describe the dynamics of the spot ethanol prices, and discounts all cash flows at a risk-free rate
(Schwartz and Smith 2000). By introducing two market price of risks, 1 and 2 , for short-run
price deviation component and long-run equilibrium price component accordingly to specify the
reductions in the drifts for each process, under an equivalent martingale measure8, the riskneutral stochastic processes can be rewritten as

8

Equivalent martingale measure assumption rules out the possibility of arbitrage. The detailed description on
equivalent martingale measure can be found in Shreve (2004) (Chapter 5), Duffie (2001) (Chapter 6), Elliott and
Kopp (2005) (Chapter 2).
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(16)

d t  (t  1 )dt   1dz1*

(17)

dt  ( *  2 )dt   2 dz2*

where dz1* and dz 2* are increments of standard Brownian motion processes with

dz1*dz2*  dt

(18)

1 and 2 reduce the adjustment speed for both the short-run price deviation component and the
long-run equilibrium price component. Different from equation (6), under risk-neutral situation,
the short-term deviation tends to revert back to  1 instead of zero and the drift of equilibrium
price is  * (defined to be   2 ) instead of  . Using similar reasoning for equations (9)-(15),
under this risk-neutral process, the expected value and variance of the log of spot price, log( St ) ,
are
E * (log( St ))  et 0  0  (1  et ) 1    *t

(19)
and

var(log( St ))  (1  e 2t )

(20)

 12
 
  22t  2(1  e t ) 1 2
2


Equations (19) and (20) provide the basic information needed to derive the futures pricing
formula.
Let FT denote the current ethanol futures market price with time T from now until
maturity. Under the risk neutral assumption, the futures contract price is equal to the forward
contract price assuming the interest rate is fixed, which means the futures contract price equals to
the expected spot price, that is,
(21)

log( FT )  log( E * ( St ))  E * (log( St )) 

where
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1
var * (log( St ))  e t 0   0  A(T )
2

A(T )  

(1  e T )1



1
2
  
  *T  (1  e 2T ) 1   22T  2(1  e T ) 1 2 
2
2
 

Equation (21) represents the functional relationship between the futures contract price and the
current short-run price deviation component level and the long-run equilibrium price component
level. The time to maturity also affects the price of the futures contract through A(T). All the
other unknowns are parameters which can be calculated through empirical estimation.

3.1.3.2

Empirical Model
The price of ethanol futures contracts can be obtained by transforming the valuation

model into an empirical model. However, the ethanol spot price is hard to determine, because it
differs between different geographic locations across the country. Moreover, it is also hard to
detect the short-run price deviation component and the long-run equilibrium price component
that make up the spot prices as in equation (5). Therefore, they can only be treated as
unobservable variables. Then, equation (21) cannot be estimated directly using time series
methods. Instead, the spot price of ethanol and the forecasted price movement of ethanol in the
future can be estimated and projected using ethanol futures price data through the Kalman filter
method.
Kalman filter is an algorithm for sequentially updating a linear projection for the system
each time a new observation is brought in (Hamilton 1994). Once the recursive relationships
between the observable variable and the prediction of unobservable variables are built, the
unknown parameters can be estimated using Maximum-Likelihood Estimation with the data
obtained. The basics on the Kalman filter method are demonstrated in Appendix A.3.
If we consider contracts with different days to maturity, T1 , T2 , , Tn , equation (21) can
be rewritten as a discrete form:
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yt  Zt  t t   dt   t

(22)
where






yt  log( FT1 ) ... log( FTn ) , n  1 vector of observed futures prices with time
maturities T1 , T2 , , Tn ;

 e T1 1


Zt   
 n  2 matrix;
e Tn 1




dt  A(T1 )  A(Tn ) n  1 vector.

 t denotes the measurement error and follows a serially uncorrelated normal distribution with
the expected value and variance to be

E ( t )  0

var( t )  H =[

]

Once the data on the futures prices are obtained, the futures prices FT1 , FT2 ,, FTn are obtained.
The time left to maturity T1 , T2 , , Tn can also be obtained. Therefore, the short-run price
deviation component  t and long-run equilibrium price component  t are the only unknown
variables in equation (22). Without knowing the value of  t and  t , the parameters in equation
(22) are impossible to be estimated. To estimate the parameters, more assumptions on  t and  t
need to be imposed. From equations (6) and (7), the state equation can be written in discrete
time steps as
(23)

 t

t   T  t 1 t 1   c  t

where
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e t
T 
 0

0
 , 2  2 matrix;
1


c  0  t  , 2  1 vector.

and where t represents the minimum time unit used in measuring time left to maturity.
Moreover, t is the random error and follows a serially uncorrelated normal distribution with

E (t )  0

2

2t  1
(
1

e
)

2
var(t )  
t 1 2
(1  e )



(1  e t )

1 2 
 

 22 t




 t and t are uncorrelated with all lags, that is,
E ( tt )  0 , t = 1, 2,…,T and s = 1, 2,…,T
Combining equations (22) and (23), the parameters  ,  1 ,  2 ,  ,  * , 1 ,  and H can
be estimated. Intuitively, the long-maturity futures contract price will give information on the
equilibrium price and the difference between near- and long-term futures prices gives
information about the short-term deviations (Schwartz and Smith 2000). Mathematically, from
equation (5), it can be presented as,
(24)

FT1  exp( 0  0 ) and FTn  exp(0 )

Therefore, if the current futures prices are known, the initial (or current) equilibrium price
component and the price deviation component can be obtained through equation (24).
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3.2

Farmers

Faced with the contract price of switchgrass proposed by the biorefinery, the farmers
choose either to accept or to reject the offer. If the offer is accepted, the farmer signs a -year
contract with the biorefinery agreeing to supply switchgrass each year to the biorefinery, and is
paid annually at the contracted price. If the offer is rejected, the farmer grows an alternative crop
instead. Corn is used as the alternative crop in this analysis. Therefore, the farmer’s decision is
based on whether the profit from signing a contract and growing switchgrass is high enough to
cover the profit earned from growing alternative crops, such as corn. In other words, the profit
from growing corn can be viewed as the reservation value considered by the farmer as to whether
to grow switchgrass or corn.

3.2.1
3.2.1.1

Switchgrass
Switchgrass Yields
The annual output level of switchgrass is determined by the inputs and other factors, such

as weather. To simplify the analysis, only the land acreage is used as the single input in this
model. Therefore, the switchgrass production function can be written as

Qsw ( L)  f1 (t , L)~
where f1 (t , L) is the total output capacity of growing switchgrass on

acres of land in year t, and

̃ is a positive random factor switchgrass output is subject to. Output capacity function f1 (t , L)
is assumed to be independent the random factors. ~ has the probability density function g () ,
cumulative density function G() , support [

], finite mean  0 and variance  2 . The

multiplication of switchgrass output capacity and the random factor means that the effect of a
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yield random factor is to amplify or to narrow the output capacity to some yield level. For
example, when the weather is abnormal in some year, e.g. a serious drought hits the region, ~
will be small, which makes the multiplication of f1 (t , L) and ~ be small. So the actual
switchgrass output level is low in that particular year, and the weather condition of that year will
not affect the switchgrass production in the next year.
However, by assuming the average yield of switchgrass from one acre of land is

across

years significantly simplifies the analysis on switchgrass production. The expected switchgrass
production from

acres of land can then be written as a linear function of land acreages, that is,

EQt ( L)   t  1L

(25)
where

is the percentage of switchgrass harvested in year t compared to the maximum annual

yield during the lifespan of switchgrass. More specifically, Mooney et al. (2009) reported that
the maximum switchgrass yield occurred from the third year after planting, while the yield in the
first year is only 14% of the maximum yield , and the yield in the second year is 60% of the
maximum. Therefore, 1  14%,  2  60%,  3  100%,  4  100%,  .  1 represents the
productivity of switchgrass out of each acre of land, and therefore it varies among different types
of landscapes. For example, the yield of switchgrass on fertile land is greater than the less fertile
land.

3.2.1.2

Switchgrass Production Cost
Assuming the average switchgrass production cost is

producing switchgrass on
(26)

acres of land can be written as,

Csw  c1Qt ( L)
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per ton, the total cost of

c1 can also be viewed as the breakeven price of producing switchgrass. It incorporates all the
switchgrass production costs, including establishment cost, maintenance cost, harvest cost, etc.

3.2.2 Corn
3.2.2.1 Corn Production
Similar to switchgrass production, the production function of corn can also be specified
as the multiplication of corn potential production f 2 ( L) and a random factor ̃:

Qcorn ( L)  f 2 (t , L) ̃
̃ is the random factor indicating all the factors affecting the production level of corn, e.g.
weather. Similar to ̃, ̃ has a density function h() , cumulative density function H () , support
[

], finite mean

and variance

. The corn production capacity function f 2 ( L) is assumed

to be independent of yield distribution H () .
To simplify the corn production function above, the average yield each year from one
acre of land across years is assumed to be  2 . Therefore, the expected corn yield each year on L
acres of land is

E (Qcorn ( L))   2 L

(27)

 2 represents the productivity of different types of landscapes. In this analysis, only two types
of landscapes, traditional crop production lands and marginal lands are considered. Expected
yields on traditional crop production lands will be larger than that from the marginal lands.
Assuming the average corn production cost is c2 per ton, the total cost of producing corn
on L acres of land can be written as,
(28)

Ccorn  c2Qcorn ( L)
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where c2 incorporates all the corn production costs, such as fertilizer purchasing cost, labor cost,
and fuel costs.

3.2.2.2 Corn Profit
The maximum expected corn profit is the opportunity cost to the farmers, when the
farmers consider signing a contract with the biorefinery to grow switchgrass for a few years.
During the same lifespan as the switchgrass contract, the expected discounted overall future corn
profit is:

E  Pt Qcorn ( L)  Ccorn e rt dt
T

(29)

0

where r is the discount factor.
Farmers will determine the optimal amount of land usage L to obtain the maximum
expected profit from corn production. Substituting equation (27) and (28) into equation (29), the
profit maximization problem faced by the farmers can be written as:
(30)

E 0  max  E ( Pt )  c2  2 Lert dt
T

L

0

s.t. L  L
where L is the amount of land owned by the farmer. Therefore, the maximum profit from
growing corn is:
(31)

E 0   E ( Pt )  c2  2 L e rt dt
T

0

Because the average yield of corn varies among different landscapes, the profit of growing corn
will also be different between traditional crop production lands and marginal lands. If all other
factors are assumed to be equal, the profit from growing corn on marginal lands will be smaller
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than that from the traditional crop production lands because the productivity (  2 ) on marginal
lands is smaller than that on traditional crop lands.

3.2.2.3 Corn Price
3.2.2.3.1

Corn Valuation Model

To simplify the analysis, corn is the only alternative traditional food crop considered by the
farmers to grow on the land in this model. The potential profit from corn production determines
whether the farmers are willing to grow switchgrass. Farmers need to project the future corn
price. However, similar to ethanol spot prices, the corn spot market price is often hard to
observe directly. Therefore, the corn futures price is used as the proxy to estimate the corn spot
prices. The Schwartz and Smith (2000) model is also used together with Kalman filter to get the
expected price of corn.
Assume that the spot price of corn at time t, Pt , can be decomposed into two parts: the


long-run equilibrium price component  t and the short-run deviation from the equilibrium

component  t , that is,


log( Pt )   t  t
Moreover, the short-run deviation component and long-run equilibrium price component are also
assumed to follow the following stochastic processes:
(32)



 
d t    t dt   1 dz1


 
dt   dt   2 dz2
 
dz1 dz2   dt
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where dz1 and dz2 are the increments of a standard Brownian motion process.

describes the

rate at which the short-run deviation is expected to disappear. Similar to the deductions in
ethanol pricing, the expected corn price in the future can be derived as a function of spot corn
price and the expected time length, that is,
1


E ( Pt )  exp  E (log( Pt ))  var(log( Pt )) 
2



(33)
or

1
 '2
  1 2 


log( E ( Pt ))  e  t 0   0   t   (1  e 2 t ) 1   2'2t  2(1  e  t )
2
2 
 



(34)

When the forecast horizon increases (t

), the log of the expected spot price will be close to

   '2      
1

1
2 
log( E ( Pt ))    0  1 
      2'2 t




4

2


 

(35)

Under risk-neutral assumption, the equations (30) (31) and (32) can be revised by
introducing martingale measurement and two prices of market risks, that is,
(36)




 
d t  (  t  1 )dt   1 dz1*

(37)




 
dt  ( *  2 )dt   2 dz2*

(38)

 
dz1* dz2*   dt





where  *     2 , dz1* and dz 2* are the increments of standard Brownian motion processes
under martingale measurement, and 1 and 2 are the market price of risks for the short-run
price deviation component and the long-run equilibrium price component. Let FT  denote the
current corn futures market price with time T from now until maturity. The futures price can be
derived as
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log( FT )  log( E * ( Pt ))  e  t 0   0  B(T )

(39)
where


 
'2
(1  e  T )1
1
*
2 T  1
'2
 T   1  2

B(T )  
  T  (1  e
)
  2 T  2(1  e )

2
2 
 



3.2.2.3.2

Empirical Model

Similar to the ethanol pricing, the parameters are estimated by applying Kalman filter
method. Considering the contracts with n different days to maturity T1 , T2 , , Tn , equation (39)
can be rewritten as a discrete form, that is
(40)



 


yt  Ft  t t   dt   t



where





yt  log( FT1 ) ... log( FTn ) , n  1 vector of observed futures prices with days


to maturity T1 , T2 , , Tn ;

e  T1 1


Ft   
 , n  2 matrix;
e  Tn 1




dt  B(T1 )  B(Tn ) , n  1 vector.

 t  denotes the measurement error and follows a serially uncorrelated normal distribution with

E ( t )  0


var( t )  H =[
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]

From equations (30) and (31), the state equation written in discrete time steps is



      G       c   
t
 t t 
 t 1 t 1 

(41)
where

e  t
G
 0

0
 , 2  2 matrix;
1


c  0   t  , 2  1 vector.

t  is the random error and follows a serially uncorrelated normal distribution with

 '2
 (1  e 2 t ) 1

2 
var(t )  
 

 t   1  2
(1  e )




E (t )  0

(1  e

 t

  1 2 

)
 

 2'2 t





 t  and t  are uncorrelated with all lags, that is,
 
E ( t t )  0 , t = 1, 2,…,T and s = 1, 2,…,T
The long-run equilibrium price component and short-run deviation component at current
time can be calculated from the following equations based on the near- and long-term futures
(Schwartz and Smith 2000):
(42)






FT1  exp( 0   0 ) and FTn  exp(0 )


The parameters needed to be calculated are   ,  1 ,  2 ,   ,  * , 1 ,   and H  . The projected
price movement trend can be obtained by substituting the estimated parameters into the
equations (34) and (35).
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3.3

Contracts

Some assumptions need to be specified in advance to build the proposed switchgrass
pricing model. First, the contract arrangement is assumed to be under a forced compliance
regime, which means that the biorefinery monitors the action of the farmers to guarantee the full
employment of the technology and resources owned by farmers (Cachon and Lariviere 2001).
The biorefinery monitoring activity is so intense that the farmers are forced to do their best to
produce the switchgrass. Farmers have no chance to “shirk” under a given contract structure.
Second, both the biorefinery and the farmers are risk neutral. Therefore, they are assumed to
pursue the maximum profit in the contract structure: a monopsonistic biorefinery would try to
suppress the contract price paid to the farmers; however, the farmers could switch to corn if the
switchgrass contract price is too low. Also, the ethanol output of the biorefinery is assumed to
be less than the market demand upper bound9, which means that no ethanol has to be put into
storage. Two different switchgrass contract types are modeled: the capacity procurement
contract and the tonnage contract.

9

The “blend wall” is created by current regulation requiring the ethanol blended into gasoline be no more than 10%
ethanol. This is the biggest barrier faced by the ethanol industry in the US, and which may cause the demand for
ethanol to be less than the supply.
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3.3.1

Capacity Procurement Contract (CPC)

3.3.1.1

Farmers’ Choice in a Capacity Procurement Contract

3.3.1.1.1

Switchgrass Profit from a Capacity Procurement Contract

In a capacity procurement contract, the biorefinery will pay a price for each unit of land
allocated toward switchgrass production. When accepting the biorefinery’s price offer, farmers
will receive CPC 10 per acre of land for all the switchgrass harvested to the biorefinery each year
within the contract lifespan. Therefore, a farmer’s gross revenue in each year from the land is

SW  CPC L

(43)

where L represents the total acreage of land contracted in producing switchgrass.
The profit of producing switchgrass under a capacity procurement contract at time can be
written by subtracting total cost Csw from total contract revenue SW :

 1(t )  SW  Csw

(44)

Because of the assumption that the contract price, land usage and total cost are independent of
time, farmers’ profit from growing switchgrass is also independent of time, that is,

 1 CPC L  c1Qt ( L)

(45)

The expected net present value of growing switchgrass is achieved by discounting all of the
future profit back to the initial time t  0 . The expected present value can be written as:
(46)
where

E   1(t )e rt dt  E  CPC   t c1 1 Lert dt
T

T

0

0

is the discount factor. Faced with the proposed contract price CPC from the biorefinery,

an own-welfare maximizing farmer would choose the optimal level of land usage by maximizing
the expected present value from growing switchgrass with the land constraint:

10

The unit of capacity procurement contract price is dollars per acre.
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E1  max  CPC   t c1 1 Lert dt
T

(47)

L

0

s.t. L  L
where ̅ is the total land owned by the farmer. Therefore, the optimal level of profit is,

E1   CPC   t c1 1 L e rt dt
T

(48)

0

by using all the land ̅ in switchgrass production.

3.3.1.1.2

Choice between Switchgrass and Corn

Farmers are willing to accept the contract price offer and supply switchgrass to the
biorefinery each year thereafter only when the expected profit from growing switchgrass E1 is
no less than the expected profit from growing corn E 0 , that is,

E1  E 0

(49)
Or,
(50)

rt
rt
0 CPC  t c1 1  L e dt  0 E( Pt )  c2  2 L e dt
T

T

In other words, E 0 is the minimum expected profit that the farmers require to grow
switchgrass. When the expected profit from producing switchgrass is less than that of producing
corn, the farmers will not turn to switchgrass production. They will still continue producing
traditional crops like corn. That means, the contract price of switchgrass should be high enough
to cover the profit foregone from corn production and the cost of switchgrass production. For
example, when the corn yield  2 is high, which means it would probably be profitable producing
corn, the switchgrass profit should also be high. Therefore, the profit from producing corn is the
opportunity cost for the farmers to enter into a contract. When the expected net revenue from
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switchgrass production is less than the corn opportunity cost, farmers would not switch from
corn production.

3.3.1.2

Capacity Procurement Contract Structure
As a first-mover, the biorefinery would always propose the switchgrass contract price

based on its expectation of the farmer’s optimal land usage. The biorefinery would own all the
bargaining power as a monopsonistic participant in switchgrass production. The biorefinery
would try to maximize its expected profit level while still giving the farmers enough incentive to
participate in growing switchgrass. Therefore, the capacity procurement contract structure can
be written as
T

max E   t e rt dt
CPC

0

s.t. E1  E 0

The biorefinery is faced with the trade-off between obtaining high profit and providing enough
incentive to the farmers. To maximize its profit, the biorefinery needs to keep the contract price
level as low as possible, because paying money to purchase switchgrass is a main cost to the
biorefinery. However, the switchgrass contract price cannot be too low, because then the
farmers will not produce switchgrass and will produce corn instead. More specifically, the
switchgrass capacity procurement contract pricing problem can be rewritten as
(51)

max
CPC

s.t.

 E(S (t ))  OMC  s  m  L  
T

t 1

0

 
T

0

CPC

L e rt dt

  t c1 1 L e rt dt   E ( Pt )  c2  2 L ert dt
T

CPC

0

Therefore, the optimal switchgrass contract price is

c1 1   t e rt dt   E ( Pt )  c2  2e rt dt
T

(52)

*
CPC


T

0

0



T

0
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e rt dt

At this contract price level, the constraint in equation (51) is binding, which means that the
contract price should be set in such a way that the expected profit from a switchgrass contract is
the same as the expected profit from corn production for each farmer. The switchgrass contract
price is subject to the farmer’s expectation of future corn price, switchgrass and corn yields and
production costs. Substituting the expected corn price equation (35) into switchgrass price
equation (52), the switchgrass price can be written as
T

*
CPC


(53)

c1 1   t e rt dt
0
T



0

e rt dt

 c2 2   2 e

 ' 2  1 2
(0  1 
4 



T

)



0

e

1
(    2' 2 r ) t
2
T



0

dt

e rt dt

or,
T

(54)



*
CPC



c1 1   t e rt dt
0
T



0

e rt dt

 c2 2 

2

1  e rT

 ' 2  1 2
)


(0  1 
1
e 4 
1
    2'2  r
2

 (  12 2' 2 r )T 
 1
e



The proof to equation (54) has been shown in the Appendix A.4. When the contract lifespan
increases ( T   ), the switchgrass price will increase from equation (54) if the discount rate is
1
large enough ( r      2'2 ). Moreover, the contracted switchgrass price will converge to a
2

fixed level given a high discount rate as the contract lifespan increases accordingly, that is,
T

(55)



*
CPC



c1 1   t e rt dt
0
T



0

e rt dt

 c2 2 

r 2
1
r      2'2
2

e

(0 

1' 2   1 2

)
4 


as T   .

The biorefinery’s profit can then be calculated by substituting the switchgrass contract price into
the biorefinery’s expected profit in equation (51). Moreover, from equation (55), the following
two results can be obtained theoretically:
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a)


a current high equilibrium corn price component (  0 ) will put the switchgrass contract
price high. For example, during the year that a drought causes the corn equilibrium price
level to be high, the contract entered by the farmers in that year will specify a higher price
than the regular years;

b)

if the corn price fluctuation is large, either from short-run impact (  1 ) or the long-run
impact (  2 ), the switchgrass contract price will tend to be higher compared to the price of
contracts entered in a year when the corn price is more stable.

3.3.2

Tonnage Contract (TC)

3.3.2. 1
3.3.2.1.1

Farmers’ Choice in a Tonnage Contract
Switchgrass Profit from a Tonnage Contract

Different from the capacity procurement contract, the tonnage contract specifies the
switchgrass contract price according to the actual switchgrass yield instead of total acreage of
land used in switchgrass production. Under the tonnage contract, the switchgrass is paid by the
biorefinery for each unit (e.g. ton) of switchgrass harvested. Farmers need to provide the entire
switchgrass yield to the biorefinery. Therefore, the biorefinery’s total switchgrass procurement
cost will be:
(56)

SW   TC Qt (L)

where TC 11 represents the switchgrass contract price under a tonnage contract. And the
farmers’ profit of producing switchgrass at time t is:

 1 (t )  SW   Csw

11

The unit of tonnage contract is dollars per ton.
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which can be written as

 1  TC Qt ( L)  c1Qt ( L)

(57)

The expected net present value of growing switchgrass is achieved by discounting all of
the future profit back to the initial time t  0 . The expected present value can be written as:
T
T

E   1 e rt dt   TC  c1  t  1Lert dt

(58)

0

0

where r is the discount factor.
Similar to the farmers’ decision under the capacity procurement contract, farmers’ land
allocation in switchgrass can be obtained by maximizing the expected profit level under the land
constraint:
T

E1  max  TC  c1  t  1Lert dt

(59)

L

0

s.t . L  L
The optimal profit level is,

 
T

(60)

0

3.3.2.1.2

TC

 c1  t  1L e rt dt

Choice between Switchgrass and Corn

The biorefinery needs to provide enough revenue to the farmers to guarantee that the
farmers have enough incentive to produce switchgrass instead of corn, that is,


E1  E 0

(61)
or,
(62)

 
T

0

TC

 c1  t  1L e rt dt   E ( Pt )  c2  2 L e rt dt
T

0
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which means the farmer will be willing to produce switchgrass only when there will be higher
expected profit level than that from producing corn.

3.3.2.2 Tonnage Contract Structure
In the tonnage contract, the biorefinery will try to maximize its own profit while
providing the farmers enough incentive to produce switchgrass. The tonnage contract structure
can be written as:
T

max E   t e rt dt

(63)

TC

0


s.t. E1  E 0
Substituting equations (58) into (63), the switchgrass tonnage contract structure can be rewritten
as
(64)

max
TC

s.t.

 E(S (t ))  OMC  s  m  L  
T

t 1

0

 
T

0

TC

 t  1L ert dt

TC

 c1  t  1L e rt dt   E ( Pt )  c2  2 L e rt dt
T

0

Therefore, the optimal switchgrass contract price under a tonnage contract is:

(65)



*
TC


 c1  2
1

 E ( P )  c e
  e dt
T

t

0

2

T

0

rt

dt

rt

t

At this price level, the constraint in equation (64) is also binding which means that the expected
profit from switchgrass contract is the same as the profit from growing corn during the contract
lifespan. Moreover, substituting the corn price expectation equation (35) into the equation (65)
above, the switchgrass contract price can be written as
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(66)

*
TC
 c1 
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1
When the contract lifespan increases, if the discount rate is high enough, r      2'2 , the
2

contract price under tonnage contract will increase to a fixed level:

(67)
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The biorefinery’s profit level can then be estimated by substituting the switchgrass tonnage
contract price into the biorefinery’s expected profit function in equation (64).
Therefore, the following results can be obtained from equation (67):
a) the higher the equilibrium corn price level, the higher the switchgrass contract price will be;
b) during the years with high corn price fluctuations  1 and  2 , the switchgrass contract price
will tend to be higher than the contract price with more stable price changes.

3.4

Summary

In summary, when the biorefinery is a monopsonistic buyer, the biorefinery will propose
to each individual farmer a contract in which a contract price is specified. The contract can
either be a capacity procurement contract in which the price is specified for each acre of land
allocated towards switchgrass production or be a tonnage contract in which the switchgrass
procurement price is specified for each ton of switchgrass purchased from this farmer. The
contract price level is given in equation (52) under a capacity procurement contract and in
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equation (65) under a tonnage contract. It can be seen from these contract pricing formulas that
the CPC or TC prices will be affected by the land productivity for both the switchgrass and the
corn, which means that the prices will be different for farmers owning different lands.
Therefore, the biorefinery can specify different contract prices based on each farmer’s land type.
The monopsonistic biorefinery will gain the largest possible profit through the price
discrimination process by providing the individual farmer with specific contract price.
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CHAPTER IV
DATA

4.1

Ethanol Futures Price Data

Ethanol futures contracts have been traded on the Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME)
for only a few years. The CME launched corn-based ethanol contracts on March 23, 2005, with
floor-based trading. Ethanol futures can be delivered every month of every year. The price of
ethanol futures contract price is quoted on the CME by dollar per gallon. One ethanol contract is
standardized to contain 29,000 gallons of ethanol. To guarantee the sample size is large enough
for empirical tests, the data used to test the ethanol empirical valuation model consist of daily
observations of ethanol futures prices from August 29, 2009 to August 31, 2012. For each date,
prices for the futures contracts maturing in 1, 3, 5, 7 and 9 months were used. Table 1 describes
the characteristics, mean value and standard deviation, of the ethanol futures price data collected
for each type of contract. With longer maturities, the futures contract price is lower, and the
price standard deviation is also lower. Moreover, the range of the ethanol futures price for the
contracts maturing in one month during this period is $1.40 - $4.23 per gallon, compared to the
price range for the contracts maturing in 3 months ($1.40 - $3.16 per gallon), 5 months ($1.45 $2.92 per gallon), 7 months ($1.46 - $2.90 per gallon) and 9 months ($1.47 - $2.88 per gallon).
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Table 1 Ethanol Futures Contract Data
Contract Maturity

Mean Price
($ per gallon)

Price Standard Deviation
($ per gallon)

1 month

2.14

0.4265

3 months

2.08

0.3740

5 months

2.05

0.3459

7 months

2.02

0.3244

9 months

2.01

0.3091

* From August 29, 2009 to August 31, 2012: 1767 Daily Observations

4.2

Corn Futures Price Data

Corn futures contracts are among the earliest contracts traded on the CME. The
maturities of corn futures are in March, May, July, September, and December of each year. The
corn futures contracts are standardized to be 5,000 bushels per contract and the corn futures price
is quoted in cents per bushel on the CME. In this analysis weekly observations of corn futures
prices are used to test the corn empirical valuation model from January 6, 1997 to December 29,
2011. For each date, prices for the futures contracts with maturity 1, 5, 9, 13 and 17 months
were used. The corn futures price data characteristics, mean value and standard deviation, for
each type of contract are described in Table 2. Moreover, the range of the corn futures price for
the contracts maturing in one month during this period is $1.86 - $7.87 per bushel, compared to
the price range for the contracts maturing in 5 month ($2.80 - $7.88 per bushel), 9 months ($2.18
- $8.05), 13 months ($2.34- $8.16) and 17 months ($2.38 - $7.00).
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Table 2 Corn Futures Contract Data
Contract Maturity

Mean Price
($ per bushel)

Price Standard Deviation
($ per bushel)

1 month

3.15

1.43

5 months

3.23

1.45

9 months

3.30

1.37

13 months

3.35

1.32

17 months

3.37

1.25

* From January 6, 1997 to December 29, 2011: 756 Weekly Observations

4.3

Ethanol Production Data

Four parameters are involved in the ethanol production process: the biorefinery’s
operation and maintenance cost, transportation cost, storage cost, and conversion rate. The
estimations of these parameters vary in the current literature. Using west Tennessee as the basis
in this analysis, the plant operation and maintenance cost is assumed to be $0.75 per gallon
(Haque and Epplin 2012). The variability of transportation cost is demonstrated in Table 3. It
ranges from $6.48 per ton to $13.86 per ton. The base value in this analysis is $10 per ton within
a 25 mile distance. The storage cost is assumed to be $3.83 per dry ton for round bales and
$17.84 per dry ton for square bales (Wang et al. 2009).
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Table 3

Transportation Cost Rate Data
Source

Transportation Cost Rate
($ per dry ton)

Walsh et al. (1998)

5 to 8 *

Duffy (2007)

6.10 **

Duffy and Nanhou (2001)

5 to 10 ***

Larson et al. (2005)

10 (Base Value)

Perrin et al. (2008)

13

* Within a 25 mile distance
** Within a 30-mile trip
*** Within a 75 mile distance

The conversion rate is shown in Table 4. The conversion rate of switchgrass into ethanol
ranges from 59.92 gallons per ton to 99.95 gallons per ton with regard to different firm size and
technology used. The base rate of 80.05 gallons per ton for medium-sized biorefinery firms is
used from Haque and Epplin (2012).
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Table 4

Estimation of Switchgrass Conversion Rate (Haque and Epplin 2012)
Conversion Rate
(gallons per ton)

Source
Haque and Epplin (2012)

99.95

Aden et al. (2002)

90.12

Schmer et al. (2008)

82.69

Haque and Epplin (2012)

80.05 (Base Value)

Humbird et al. (2011)

79.09

Sendich et al. (2008)

77.90

Wingren et al. (2003)

76.94

Wingren et al. (2004)

73.10

Sendich et al. (2008)

69.99

Wu et al. (2010)

69.99

Kazi et al. (2010)

69.03

Wingren et al. (2003)

67.11

Eggeman and Elander (2005)

64.95

Haque and Epplin (2012)

59.92

* Variation in conversion rate assumptions reflects the difference in ethanol production technology with regard to different firm size.
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4.4

Switchgrass Production Data

4.4.1 Switchgrass Yields
According to Mooney et al. (2009), the first- and second- year switchgrass yields are 14%
and 60% respectively of the third-year yield which can be considered as the maximum yield
(Griffith et al. 2012). The switchgrass maximum yield varies in the current literature. Table 5 is
a summary of the switchgrass yield estimations. The estimation ranges from 3.79 tons per acre
to 7.89 tons per acre. Generally speaking, the yields in northern states are less than those in
southern states because of the variation between upland and lowland.
Land in West Tennessee is divided into four different landscapes (Mooney et al. 2009;
Boyer et al. 2012): (i) a well-drained level upland (WDLU), (ii) a well- to moderately welldrained floodplain (WDFP), (iii) a moderate to somewhat poorly drained eroded sloping upland
(MDSU), (iv) a poorly drained floodplain (PDFP). The relative position of these four landscapes
is demonstrated in Figure 2. The average switchgrass yield between 2006 and 2011 from each
landscape is shown in Table 6 (Boyer et al. 2012).
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Table 5 Switchgrass Yield Estimation Data
Switchgrass Yields
(tons per acre)

Source
Walsh et al. (2003)

5.49

Duffy (2007)

4.00

Khanna et al. (2008)

4.20

Pimentel and Patzek (2005)

4.91

Fike et al. (2006)

5.45

McLaughlin and Kszos (2005)

6.16

Muir et al. (2001)

5.97

Epplin et al. (2007)

6.06

* Variation reflects differences in location and land type

(III) MDSU***
(IV) PDFP****

(I) WDLU*

(II) WDFP**

* well-drained level upland
** well- to moderately well-drained floodplain
*** moderate to somewhat poorly drained eroded sloping upland
**** poorly drained floodplain

Figure 2

Four Landscapes in Tennessee

56

Table 6

Switchgrass Yield from Four Landscapes in Tennessee (Boyer et al. 2012)
Landscape

Yield
(tons per acre)

WDLU *

7.65

WDFP **

8.33

MDSU ***

8.64

PDFP ****

6.62

* well-drained level upland
** well- to moderately well-drained floodplain
*** moderate to somewhat poorly drained eroded sloping upland
**** poorly drained floodplain

4.4.2 Switchgrass Breakeven Price
The estimated average production cost, or farm-gate breakeven price, of switchgrass also
varies in the literature. Table 7 shows breakeven price estimations done by researchers in
different states and range from $45.91 per dry ton to $94.80 per dry ton and reflects differences
in farm-gate price or price delivered to biorefineries. Based on the research done by Mooney et
al. (2009) and Boyer et al. (2012), the breakeven price of producing switchgrass on four types of
landscapes in west Tennessee is shown in Table 8.
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Table 7

Switchgrass Breakeven Price Estimations
Source

Breakeven Price Estimation
($ per dry ton)

Duffy (2007)

91.05

Khanna et al. (2008)

88.9

Perrin et al. (2008)

53.52

Mooney et al. (2009)

$42.90 to $62.23

Epplin et al. (2007)

50.80

Walsh et al. (2003)

49.91

* Variation in method of storage, payment of transportation, and storage costs.

Table 8

Switchgrass Breakeven Price for Four Landscapes in Tennessee
(Mooney et al. 2012; Boyer et al. 2012)
Landscape

Breakeven Price
($ per ton)

WDLU *

53.10

WDFP **

48.31

MDSU ***

49.76

PDFP ****

58.14

* well-drained level upland
** well- to moderately well-drained floodplain
*** moderate to somewhat poorly drained eroded sloping upland
**** poorly drained floodplain
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4.5

Corn Production Data

Based on the tests done on corn grain yield in Tennessee by Allen et al. from 2007 to
2012 for 17 early-season corn hybrids and the field crop budget made by the University of
Tennessee Extension, the average yield of corn was assumed to be 150 bushels per acre for
traditional croplands. The corn yield on marginal lands is much lower than that grown on
traditional croplands. Varvel et al. (2008) reported that the average yield of corn on marginal
land is roughly 97 bushels per acre based on different levels of nitrogen application. The
average cost of growing corn is estimated to be $450.52 per acre according to the field crop
budgets for 2013 made by the University of Tennessee Extension (McKinley and Gerloff 2013).

Table 9

Corn Yield from Four Landscapes in Tennessee
Yield
(bushels per acre)

Landscape
WDLU *
Traditional Crop Production Land

150
WDFP **
MDSU ***

Marginal Land

97
PDFP ****

* well-drained level upland
** well- to moderately well-drained floodplain
*** moderate to somewhat poorly drained eroded sloping upland
**** poorly drained floodplain
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4.6

Summary of Production Parameters

Table 10 indicates the production parameters used in this analysis to represent a case
situation in west Tennessee. The first column displays the symbols used in Chapter III. The
second column describes the symbols in the first column. The third column shows the value of
the parameters in this analysis.
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Table 10
Symbol

OMC

̅

Summary of Production Parameters for the West Tennessee Case Study
Description

Base Value

Conversion Rate (gallons per ton)

80

Storage Cost ($ per ton)

3.83

Transportation Cost ($ per ton)

10

Plant and Maintenance Average Cost ($ per gallon)

0.75

Discount Rate

8%

Land Endowment (acres)

Average Yield of Switchgrass
(tons per acre)

Average Cost of Switchgrass
($ per ton)

Average Yield of Corn
(bushels per acre)

̅ **

133 *
WDFP

7.65

WDLU

8.33

MDSU

8.64

PDFP

6.62

WDFP

53.10

WDLU

48.31

MDSU

49.76

PDFP

58.14

WDFP

150

WDLU

150

MDSU

97

PDFP

97

Average Cost of Corn
($ per acre)

*Land endowment is assumed to be the average farm acreage in Tennessee (Jensen et al. 2007).
** ̅
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450.52

CHAPTER V
RESULTS

5.1

Expected Ethanol Price

The Kalman filtering process is used to estimate the ethanol spot price and the
expectation of ethanol price in the future based on the historical data of the ethanol futures
prices. The parameters in the state space model, equations (18) and (19) in Chapter III, can be
calculated efficiently through the maximum likelihood estimation shown in Appendix A.3. By
varying the parameters and rerunning the Kalman filter for each initial group of parameters, the
parameters that maximize the log-likelihood function can be identified (Schwartz and Smith
2000). Under the five contracts with five different maturity lengths, the parameters to be
estimated are  ,  1 ,  2 ,  ,  * , 1 ,  and H , plus the variance-covariance matrix of
measurement error H ( s1 , s2 , s3 , s4 and s5 ). To guarantee that the parameters obtained are the
global maximum estimator, different initial values are used to solve the optimization problem.
Using the ethanol futures data from August 29, 2005 to August 31, 2012, the maximum
likelihood estimators are shown in Table 11.
All the estimated parameters are significant at the 1% level (Table 11). The estimated
values of measurement error standard deviation are small, which indicates that the ethanol
futures pricing equation (17) describes the futures pricing mechanism well. Furthermore, using
the average 1-month and 5-month ethanol futures prices from May 5, 2005 to December 31,
2012, $2.13 and $2.00 per gallon, the current short-run price deviation component  0 and the
long-run equilibrium price component  0 can be estimated:
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exp( 0  0 )  2.13 and exp( 0 )  2.00
Therefore,  0  0.06 and  0  0.69 .

Table 11 Maximum-Likelihood Parameter Estimates (Ethanol)
Parameter

Description

Estimate

Standard Error

Short-term Mean reverting rate

0.80

0.0850

Short-term volatility

0.58

0.0431

Equilibrium volatility

0.40

0.0353

Equilibrium drift rate

0.02

0.1226

Risk-neutral equilibrium drift rate

0.15

0.0302

Short-term market price of risks

0.46

0.0394

Correlation in increments

-0.74

0.0506

Contract
Maturity
Standard deviation for measurement error

1 month

0.044

0.0008

Standard deviation for measurement error

2 months

0.004

0.0005

Standard deviation for measurement error

3 months

0.019

0.0003

Standard deviation for measurement error

4 months

0.018

0.0003

Standard deviation for measurement error

5 months

0.007

0.0004
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The estimated spot market price of ethanol, subject to the maximum-likelihood
parameters, is shown in Figure 3, and in relation to the futures price with the closest maturity (1
month). The ethanol spot price and the 1-month-to-maturity futures contract price coincide
(Figure 3) which is consistent with the theory that the futures price and spot price are converging
to each other as the futures contract approaches maturity.

4.5
Estimated Price
1-month Futures Price

4

Price ($)

3.5

3

2.5

2

1.5

1
Jul-05

Figure 3

Nov-06

Apr-08

Aug-09
Time

Dec-10

May-12

Sep-13

Estimated Ethanol Spot Market Price and One-Month Ethanol Futures Price

With the estimated parameters in Table 11, the expected ethanol price movement can be
calculated from equation (14) in Chapter III. The projected ethanol prices in the following five
years (2014-2018) are displayed in Table 12. The ethanol price will be between $2.10 and $2.18
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per gallon. This is very close to the ethanol effective retail price forecasted by the Food and
Agricultural Policy Research Institute (FAPRI) at the University of Missouri ($2.00-2.06 per
bushel from 2014 to 2018) (FAPRI-MU 2013). The projected ethanol price will first decrease
and then increase after 2015.

Table 12 The Ethanol Price* Forecast (2014-2018)

Years

2014

2015

2016

2017

2018

Price
($ per gallon)

2.11

2.10

2.11

2.14

2.18

* in 2013 dollars

5.2

Expected Corn Price

Similar to section 5.1, the maximum-likelihood corn price estimators can also be obtained





through Kalman filter process. The parameters to be estimated are:   ,  1 ,  2 ,   ,  * , 1 ,

  and H  , plus the variance-covariance matrix of measurement error H  ( s1 , s2 , s3 , s4 and

s5 ). Table 13 presents the maximum-likelihood estimators in the corn pricing process.
Different initial parameter values have also been tried to guarantee that the log-likelihood value
is the largest. The data used are the corn futures prices with 1-month, 5-month, 9-month, 13month, and 17-month left to maturity from January 6, 1997 to December 29, 2011.
All the estimated parameters are significant at the 1% level, which means that the
Kalman filter has used the historical data efficiently and the corn pricing model describes the
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corn price movement. Furthermore, using the average September and October price of 1-month
and 17-month corn futures contracts from 2007 to 2012, $5.19 and $5.37 per bushel accordingly,
the current short-run price deviation component and the long-run equilibrium price component  0'
and  0' can be estimated:
exp( 0'  0' )  5.19 and exp( 0' )  5.37

Therefore,  0'  0.03 and  0'  1.68 .

Table 13 Maximum-Likelihood Parameter Estimates (Corn)
Parameter

Description

Estimate

Standard Error

Short-term Mean reverting rate

0.51

0.0661

Short-term volatility

0.32

0.0257

Equilibrium volatility

0.19

0.0153

Equilibrium drift rate

0.02

0.0481

Risk-neutral equilibrium drift rate

-0.17

0.0214

Short-term market price of risks

-0.09

0.0340

Correlation in increments

-0.33

0.1182

Contract
Maturity
Standard deviation for measurement error

1 month

0.008

0.0020

Standard deviation for measurement error

5 months

-0.016

0.0010

Standard deviation for measurement error

9 months

0.019

0.0006

Standard deviation for measurement error

13 months

-0.012

0.0017

Standard deviation for measurement error

17 months

-0.023

0.0020
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Figure 4 displays the spot market price of corn estimated under the maximum-likelihood
parameters in Table 2. The current futures prices with 1-month left to maturity are also depicted
in Figure 4. The corn spot price and the 1-month futures price coincide which is consistent with
the theory that the futures price converges to the spot price as the contract gets closer to
expiration (Hull 2009).

8

7

Price ($)

6

5

4

3
Estimated Price
1-month Futures Price

2

1
Feb-04

Figure 4

Jul-05

Nov-06

Apr-08
Time

Aug-09

Dec-10

May-12

Estimated Corn Spot Market Price and One-Month Corn Futures Price

Using the estimated parameters in Table 13, the expected corn price path in the future can
be estimated from equation (34) in Chapter III. The estimated prices in the following five years
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are shown in Table 14. The projected price is also close to the corn farm price projected by
FAPRI between 2014 and 2018, $5.18-4.83 per bushel (FAPRI 2013). The corn price projection
shows a trend of decreasing in next a few years.

Table 14 The Corn Price* Forecast (2014-2018)
Years

2014

2015

2016

2017

2018

Price
($ per bushel)

5.45

5.29

5.10

4.89

4.69

* in 2013 dollars

5.3

Switchgrass Capacity Procurement Contract

5.3.1 Switchgrass CPC Price and the Biorefinery’s Profitability
In this analysis, a five-year contract lifespan assumption is adopted. Based on the
capacity procurement contract structure (equation (51)) and the assumption that the first year’s
and the second year’s harvest are only 14% and 60% of the third, fourth, and fifth year’s harvest,
which means that 1  14% ,  2  60% , and  3   4   5  100% (Mooney et al. 2009), the
switchgrass contract price under the capacity procurement contract can be estimated from
equation (52). Besides the projections of the corn price and ethanol price in the following 5
years (2014-2018), the information in Table 10 is also used. Moreover, the contract price will be
affected by the land quality on which the switchgrass is grown. The west Tennessee per acre
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contract prices for four types of landscapes (WDFP, WDLU, MDSU, and PDFP) under a fiveyear capacity procurement contract are shown in Table 15.
Table 15 CPC Price and the Biorefinery’s Profit Estimation

Contract Price
(dollars per acre)

Biorefinery’s Profit*
(in thousand dollars)

WDFP

795

13.5

WDLU

792

53.7

MDSU

474

240.1

PDFP

442

142.2

Landscapes

Traditional Cropland

Marginal Land
* Discounted five-year profit from a contract on 133 acres of land

The per acre contract prices on traditional croplands (WDFP and WDLU) are much
higher than per acre prices on the marginal lands (MDSU and PDFP) ($795 and $792 per acre
compared to $474 and $442 per acre). The price of switchgrass grown on a well- to moderately
well-drained floodplain (WDFP) is the highest ($795/acre) while the price of switchgrass grown
on a poorly drained floodplain (PDFP) is the lowest ($442/acre). The reason for the large price
difference shown in Table 15 is due to the large difference in corn yields grown on traditional
croplands and marginal lands. The yield of corn on traditional croplands is much larger than that
on marginal land (150 bushels per acre compared to 97 bushels per acre). Considering that the
corn price is relatively high since 2007 compared to the price level in the 1990s and early 2000s,
the corn farmers will have a relatively high profit level from traditional croplands. Therefore,
the biorefinery will have to propose a high switchgrass contract price to encourage the farmers to
switch to growing switchgrass instead of growing corn. However, because the corn yields on
marginal lands are relatively low, though the corn price is relatively high, the total corn profit
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level will still be much lower than that from traditional croplands. Therefore, a lower contract
price will be a suitable proposal by the biorefinery to those farmers on marginal lands.
Consequently, the farmers’ expected profit, total switchgrass revenue minus explicit switchgrass
production cost, from each contract (5 years, 133 acres) can also be calculated. On WDFP and
WDLU lands, the expected profit from each contract is $267.9 thousand, and on MDSU and
PDFP lands, the expected profit from each contract is $88.7 thousand.
Because the capacity procurement contract prices proposed on different landscapes are
different, the biorefinery’s profits also vary based on different land types (Table 15). The
projected profits from the contracts in turn affect the biorefinery’s selection of the farmer with
whom to sign a contract. From the biorefinery’s profit function in equation (51), the switchgrass
contract prices that make the biorefinery breakeven under four landscapes (WDFP, WDLU,
MDSU, and PDFP) can be estimated, which are $820, 893, 927, and 710 per acre with regard to
the contracts signed with farmers on WDFP, WDLU, MDSU, and PDFP lands. The estimated
contract prices are all lower than these prices. That indicates the biorefinery will have positive
profit from each contract regardless of the type of land the farmer owns. Moreover, the expected
profit the biorefinery can get from each contract on each type of landscape is shown in Table 15.
There is a significant profit difference between the contract on traditional croplands and marginal
lands. The estimated biorefinery profits from traditional croplands are much lower than that
from marginal lands ($13.5 thousand and $53.7 thousand compared to $240.1 thousand and
$142.2 thousand). Therefore, the biorefinery will not choose to sign capacity procurement
contracts with farmers on traditional croplands (WDFP and WDLU) if they can sign contracts
with farmers on marginal lands (MDSU and PDFP). Moreover, the profit from MDSU land is
notably higher than the profit from PDFP land ($240.1 thousand compared to $142.2 thousand
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per contract) though the contract prices are close to each other ($474 per acre compared to $442
per acre). The reason is that the average yield of switchgrass on MDSU is higher than that on
PDFP (8.64 tons per acre compared to 6.62 tons per acre), and the average cost of switchgrass
production on MDSU is lower than that on PDFP ($49.76 per ton compared to $58.14 per ton).
Therefore, the biorefinery can not only purchase the switchgrass at a lower price, but also have a
larger average supply from farmers on MDSU lands.
The expected ethanol price level also limits the biorefinery’s profit prediction. The
current technology limits the ability of making ethanol out of switchgrass, that is, the conversion
rate limits the biorefinery’s profitability. With the advance of technology in converting
switchgrass into ethanol, the conversion rate will be higher. Then the biorefinery will have the
ability to produce more ethanol out of a fixed amount of switchgrass, which will increase its
revenue and promote profitability. In all, at current circumstances, the biorefinery will prefer to
sign capacity procurement contracts with farmers on marginal lands, especially with farmers on
the MDSU lands.
As indicated above, the switchgrass CPC price is composed of two parts: the switchgrass
production cost and corn profit. The switchgrass CPC price not only needs to cover the
switchgrass production cost, but also needs to cover the potential profit from alternative land
usage, such as producing corn. Figure 5 shows the percentages in switchgrass capacity
procurement contract prices from these two components under the four landscapes. For
example, on the WDFP land, 36.5% of the CPC price ($290 out of $795 per acre) is to cover the
switchgrass production cost, while 63.5% of the CPC price ($505 out of $795 per acre) is to
cover the opportunity cost from the potential to produce corn. In contrast, on the MDSU land,
64.8% of the CPC price ($307 out of $474 per acre) is to cover the switchgrass production cost,
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while 35.2% of the CPC price ($167 out of $474 per acre) is to cover the corn potential profit.
Therefore, on traditional croplands (WDFP and WDLU), the potential gain from producing corn
has a larger share in switchgrass CPC price determination than the switchgrass production cost.
However, on marginal lands (MDSU and PDFP), the switchgrass production cost is the key
determinant and has a larger share in switchgrass CPC price determination than corn profit.
Therefore, when corn price increases, the CPC price for switchgrass on traditional croplands will
react to a larger extent than that of switchgrass grown on marginal lands; however, the advance
in switchgrass production technology which lowers the switchgrass production cost will affect
the CPC price on marginal lands to a larger extent.

Figure 5

Percentages in CPC Price from Switchgrass Cost and Corn Profit
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5.3.2 Sensitivity Analysis
Four key factors play important roles in switchgrass pricing: corn price forecast,
switchgrass average yield, corn average yield, and discount rate. The corn price has been
forecast in Section 5.2, and the switchgrass average yield, corn yield, and the discount rate are
based on the estimations in current literature. The estimated switchgrass CPC price has been
given in Table 15. Through sensitivity analysis, the impacts of the change in these factors on
switchgrass CPC price can be analyzed.
If the corn price projection decreases by 10%, the projected corn prices will be $4.91,
$4.76, $4.59, $4.40, and $4.22 per bushel in each year from 2014 to 2018. Table 16 shows the
new switchgrass price estimation and percentage change after revising the corn price forecast.
The contract price then will be $699 per acre for switchgrass grown on WDFP and $697 per acre
for switchgrass on WDLU compared to $413 per acre and $380 per acre for MDSU and PDFP
respectively. The decrease in switchgrass contract price is relatively the same among these four
types of lands, ranging from 11.9% to 14.1% following the 10% decrease in corn price forecast.
Therefore, the elasticities of corn price projection on CPC contract price are approximately 1.21,
1.19, 1.29, and 1.41 for switchgrass grown on WDFP, WDLU, MSDU, and PDFP lands
accordingly. That indicates that the switchgrass CPC price is sensitive to the corn price
projection, and the switchgrass CPC price decrease on marginal lands is slightly larger than the
price decrease on traditional croplands. The switchgrass contract price needs to be adjusted by a
higher percentage than the corresponding change in corn price projection. Accordingly, the
biorefinery’s profit will increase if the CPC price decreases (Table 16). Contracts on MDSU
land continues to bring the highest profits for the biorefinery among these four landscapes.
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Table 16 Impact of 10% Decrease in Corn Price Forecast on Switchgrass CPC Price and
the Biorefinery’s Profit
Landscapes

New Switchgrass Price
(dollars per acre)

% Decrease in
Switchgrass Price

Biorefinery’s Profit*
(in thousand dollars)

WDFP

699

12.1

64.3

WDLU

697

11.9

104.4

MDSU

413

12.9

$272.9

PDFP

380

14.1

$175.0

* Discounted five-year profit from a contract on 133 acres of land

When the switchgrass yields increase by 10%, the new switchgrass yield levels will be
8.41, 9.16, 9.50, and 7.28 tons per acre for WDFP, WDLU, MDSU, and PDFP respectively.
Table 17 reports the impact on switchgrass CPC prices if the switchgrass yields increase by 10%.
The switchgrass CPC price increases following the increase in switchgrass yield. The
switchgrass price on MDSU and PDFP is more sensitive to the switchgrass yields (6.5% and
6.3%) compared to the WDFP and WDLU lands (3.7% and 3.7%). Therefore, the elasticities of
switchgrass yield on switchgrass CPC price are 0.37, 0.37, 0.65, and 0.63 for switchgrass grown
on WDFP, WDLU, MDSU, and PDFP accordingly. For all four landscapes, the switchgrass
yield does not have a very strong impact on switchgrass price: the switchgrass CPC price
increases by a lesser percentage than the increase in switchgrass yield. Moreover, the CPC price
adjustments on marginal lands (MDSU and PDFP) are much higher (almost doubled) than that
on traditional croplands (WDFP and WDLU), which indicates on less-fertile lands, the yield of
switchgrass is more critical in switchgrass CPC price determination than that on more fertile
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lands. The biorefinery’s profit will increase, but will not change the fact that the biorefinery will
prefer to sign contracts with farmers on marginal lands.

Table 17 Impact of 10% Increase in Switchgrass Yield on Switchgrass CPC Price and the
Biorefinery’s Profit
Landscapes

New Switchgrass Price
(dollars per acre)

% Increase in
Switchgrass Price

Biorefinery’s Profit*
(in thousand dollars)

WDFP

824

3.7

41.5

WDLU

821

3.7

85.8

MDSU

505

6.5

272.9

PDFP

470

6.3

165.2

* Discounted five-year profit from a contract on 133 acres of land

If the corn yields decrease by 10%, the new corn yields levels will be 135 bushels per
acre and 87 bushels per acre for traditional croplands and marginal lands accordingly. Table 18
shows the impact of corn yield changes on switchgrass CPC Prices. The switchgrass price will
decrease following the decrease in corn yields. For a 10% decrease in corn yields, the CPC
prices decrease by 12.1%, 11.9%, 13.3%, and 14.3% for switchgrass grown on WDPF, WDLU,
MDSU, and PDFP accordingly. Therefore, the elasticities of corn yields on switchgrass CPC
price are approximately 1.21, 1.19, 1.33, and 1.43 for each of these four types of land. The corn
yields have a large impact on the switchgrass CPC price: the CPC price decreases by a larger
percentage than the decrease in corn yields. The biorefinery’s profit increases when the corn
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yields decreases, but still, the biorefinery will prefer to sign contracts with farmers on marginal
lands.

Table 18 Impact of 10% Decrease in Corn Yield on Switchgrass CPC Price and the
Biorefinery’s Profit
Landscapes

New Switchgrass Price
(dollars per acre)

% Decrease in
Switchgrass Price

Biorefinery’s Profit*
(in thousand dollars)

WDFP

699

12.1

64.3

WDLU

697

11.9

104.2

MDSU

411

13.3

273.8

PDFP

379

14.3

175.7

* Discounted five-year profit from a contract on 133 acres of land

If farmers perceive switchgrass production to be more risky compared to corn production,
the discount rate considered by the farmers for switchgrass production will be higher. Therefore,
a 10% discount rate is assumed for switchgrass production while keeping the discount rate for
ethanol production and corn production at 8%. The switchgrass CPC price and the biorefinery’s
profit can be re-estimated. Table 19 shows the switchgrass CPC price and the biorefinery’s
profit level on four landscapes under the 10% switchgrass production discount rate. The
biorefinery needs to raise the contract price when the farmers believe that the switchgrass
production contract contains higher risks. Consequently, the biorefinery’s profit will decrease
following the increase in the switchgrass capacity procurement contract prices.
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Table 19 Switchgrass CPC Price and the Biorefinery’s Profit under 10% Discount Rate
Landscapes

Switchgrass Price
(dollars per acre)

% Increase in
Switchgrass Price

Biorefinery’s Profit*
(in thousand dollars)

WDFP

818

3.0

1.1

WDLU

816

3.0

41.2

MDSU

480

1.2

237.3

PDFP

448

1.3

139.1

* Discounted five-year profit from a contract on 133 acres of land

5.4

Switchgrass Tonnage Contract

5.4.1 Switchgrass TC Price and the Biorefinery’s Profitability
Similar to the capacity procurement contract, a five-year stand switchgrass tonnage
contract is assumed to be the contract lifespan for both the biorefinery and farmers. Based on the
tonnage contract pricing equation (64) and the assumption that the first year’s and second year’s
harvest is only 14% and 60% of the yield in the third, fourth and fifth year ( 1  14% ,

 2  60% , and  3   4   5  100% ) (Mooney et al. 2009), the switchgrass contract prices
under the tonnage contract are shown in Table 20. The switchgrass TC prices are also affected
by the type of landscape on which the switchgrass is grown. Using west Tennessee as a case
study, Table 20 shows the contract price for each of the four typical landscapes (WDFP, WDLU,
MDSU, and PDFP) under a five-year stand (2014-2018) switchgrass tonnage contract.
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Table 20 TC Price and the Biorefinery’s Profit Estimation
Contract Price
(dollars per ton)

Biorefinery’s Profit*

WDFP

145

13.6

WDLU

133

53.7

MDSU

77

240.1

PDFP

93

142.2

Landscape

(in thousand dollars)

Traditional Cropland

Marginal Land
* Discounted five-year profit from a contract on 133 acres of land

Similar to the CPC price, the tonnage contract prices on traditional croplands (WDFP and
WDLU) are much higher than the prices on the marginal lands (MDSU and PDFP). The per ton
price of switchgrass grown on a well- to moderately well-drained floodplain (WDFP) is the
highest ($145/ton) while the per ton price of switchgrass grown on a moderate-to-somewhatpoorly-drained eroded sloping upland (MDSU) is the lowest ($77/ton). The TC price on WDLU
land ($133 per ton) is similar to the price on WDFP land, and the TC price on PDFP land ($93
per ton) is similar to the price on MDSU land. The price difference between switchgrass on
traditional croplands and switchgrass on marginal lands is due to the large difference in corn
yields grown on traditional croplands and marginal lands (150 bushels per acre compared to 97
bushels per acre). With the corn price prediction in the following five years, a relatively high
corn profit level can be expected on traditional croplands. Therefore, the biorefinery needs to
propose a high enough switchgrass TC price level to give the farmers incentive to grow
switchgrass. In contrast, because the corn yields on marginal lands are relatively low, though the
corn price can be expected to be high, the total profit level will still be much lower than that from
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traditional croplands. Therefore, a low contract price can be proposed by the biorefinery to those
farmers on marginal lands.
Compared to the estimated breakeven prices in current literature (Table 7), the tonnage
contract price on traditional land is much higher than estimated breakeven prices. One reason is
that most breakeven estimates do not take the opportunity cost from alternative land usage into
account. Therefore, during the recent years when the corn price is high, the contract price in this
analysis also needs to be high to compensate the farmers’ potential loss on corn production. This
is especially the case on traditional croplands. Moreover, the tonnage contract price estimated in
this analysis on the marginal lands is only slightly higher than the breakeven prices estimated in
other research, such as Mooney et al. (2009). This suggests that the opportunity cost to grow
switchgrass on marginal lands is much lower compared to the traditional croplands.
Table 20 also shows the biorefinery’s profit level. The biorefinery will prefer to buy the
switchgrass from the farmers planting on marginal lands. Farmers on MDSU lands will be the
first choice for the biorefinery to offer a switchgrass tonnage contract. Similar to the capacity
procurement contract, besides switchgrass contract price difference, the low ethanol price
forecast and limitation in current conversion rate are also the main factors restricting the
biorefinery’s profitability.
For each landscape, the switchgrass TC price is also determined by the switchgrass
production cost and corn profit. On WDFP land, 36.5% of the TC price ($52.9 out of $145 per
ton) is to cover the switchgrass production cost, while 63.5% of the TC price ($92.1 out of $145
per ton) is to cover the potential corn profit. In contrast, 64.8% of the TC price ($49.9 out of $77
per ton) on MDSU land is to cover the switchgrass production cost, while 35.2% of the TC price
($27.1 out of $77 per ton) is to compensate for the corn profit. On traditional croplands (WDFP
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and WDLU), the potential gain from producing corn is more important than the switchgrass
production cost in switchgrass tonnage contract price determination. However, on marginal
lands (MDSU and PDFP), the switchgrass production cost is the key determinant.

Figure 6

Percentages in TC Price from Switchgrass Cost and Corn Profit

5.4.2 Sensitivity Analysis
In this section, the impacts of the key factors, corn price forecast, switchgrass yield, corn
yield and discount rate, on tonnage contracts are analyzed through sensitivity analysis.
If the corn price decreases by 10%, the corn prices will be $4.91, $4.76, $4.59, $4.40, and
$4.22 per bushel in each year from 2014 to 2018. Table 21 shows the new switchgrass price
estimation and percentage change after revising the corn price forecast. For all four types of

80

landscapes, the switchgrass price decreases following the decrease in forecasted corn price. On
traditional croplands, the switchgrass contract prices decrease to $128 and $117 per ton for
WDFP and WDLU or by 11.7% and 12.0% respectively. The elasticities of corn price prediction
on switchgrass TC price are 1.17 and 1.20 accordingly for WDFP and WDLU. In contrast, the
prices decrease to $67 and $80 per ton on MDSU and PDFP or by 13.0% and 14.0%
respectively. The elasticities of corn price prediction on MDSU and PDFP on the switchgrass
TC prices are 1.30 and 1.40 accordingly. All the elasticities are greater than 1 which indicates
the percentage change in switchgrass TC price will be larger than the percentage change in
predicted corn prices. Moreover, the percentage changes on marginal lands are more than that
on traditional croplands, though they are similar. The biorefinery still prefers to sign contracts to
purchase switchgrass from farmers on marginal lands, especially on MDSU lands, though the
profits have increased for each type of landscapes.

Table 21 Impact of 10% Decrease in Corn Price Forecast on Switchgrass TC Price and the
Biorefinery’s Profit
Landscapes

New Switchgrass Price
(dollars per ton)

% Decrease in
Switchgrass Price

Biorefinery’s Profit*
(in thousand dollars)

WDFP

128

11.7

64.3

WDLU

117

12.0

104.4

MDSU

67

13.0

$272.9

PDFP

80

14.0

$175.0

* Discounted five-year profit from a contract on 133 acres of land
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When the switchgrass yield increases by 10%, the new switchgrass yield levels will be
8.41, 9.16, 9.50, and 7.28 tons per acre for WDFP, WDLU, MDSU, and PDFP respectively.
Table 22 reports the impact of switchgrass yield increase on switchgrass TC prices. The
switchgrass price will decrease following the increase in switchgrass yield. When the
switchgrass yield increases by 10% on each type of land, the switchgrass price will decrease by
5.5%, 6.0%, 3.9% and 3.2% with respect to WDFP, WDLU, MDSU, and PDFP accordingly.
The elasticities of switchgrass yield on switchgrass TC price will be 0.55, 0.60, 0.39, and 0.32
for WDFP, WDLU, MDSU, and PDFP accordingly. Compared to the switchgrass yield
elasticities for capacity procurement contract, the impact of switchgrass yield on switchgrass
tonnage contract price on MDSU and PDFP is much smaller. The biorefinery’s profit will
increase, but will not change the preference to contract with farmers on marginal lands.

Table 22 Impact of 10% Increase in Switchgrass Yield on Switchgrass TC Price and the
Biorefinery’s Profit
Landscapes

New Switchgrass Price
(dollars per ton)

% Decrease in
Switchgrass Price

Biorefinery’s Profit*
(in thousand dollars)

WDFP

137

5.5

41.5

WDLU

125

6.0

85.8

MDSU

74

3.9

272.9

PDFP

90

3.2

165.2

* Discounted five-year profit from a contract on 133 acres of land

If the corn yield decreases by 10%, the new corn yields levels will be 135 bushels per
acre and 87 bushels per acre for traditional croplands and marginal lands accordingly. Table 23
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reports the switchgrass price change following the corn yield decrease. On WDFP land, the
switchgrass TC price will decrease from $145 to $128 per ton or 11.7%. On WDLU land, the
switchgrass price will decrease from $133 to $117 per ton or 12.0%. On MDSU land, the
switchgrass price will decrease from $77 to $67 per ton or 13.0%, while on PDFP land the
switchgrass price will decrease from $93 to $80 per ton or 14.0%. Therefore, the elasticities of
corn yield on switchgrass tonnage contract will be 1.17, 1.20, 1.30, and 1.40. All the corn yield
elasticities are higher than 1 which means that the switchgrass TC price will decrease by a larger
percentage than the decrease in corn yields. The biorefinery will still prefer to choose to build a
contractual relationship with farmers planting on MDSU and PDFP lands.

Table 23 Impact of 10% Decrease in Corn Yield on Switchgrass TC Price and the
Biorefinery’s Profit
Landscapes

New Switchgrass Price
(dollars per ton)

% Decrease in
Switchgrass Price

Biorefinery’s Profit*
(in thousand dollars)

WDFP

128

11.7

64.3

WDLU

117

12.0

104.2

MDSU

67

13.0

273.8

PDFP

80

14.0

175.7

* Discounted five-year profit from a contract on 133 acres of land

If the farmers believe that producing switchgrass is more risky than producing corn, the
discount rate for switchgrass production will be higher than that for corn production. Assuming
the discount rate for the farmers to produce switchgrass is 10% while the discount rate for the
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ethanol and corn production is still 8%, the new switchgrass tonnage contract can be reestimated. Table 24 shows the switchgrass TC price and the biorefinery’s profit level on four
landscapes under the 10% switchgrass production discount rate. The switchgrass tonnage
contract price will increase slightly following the increase in the switchgrass production discount
rate. Consequently, the biorefinery’s profit will decrease following the increase in the
switchgrass tonnage contract price. The biorefinery will still prefer to sign contracts with
farmers on marginal lands. Moreover, under 10% discount rate for switchgrass production, the
biorefinery will not offer a contract with the farmers on WDFP land because the biorefinery will
expect a negative profit from each contract.

Table 24 Switchgrass TC Price and the Biorefinery’s Profit under 10% Discount Rate
Landscapes

Switchgrass Price
(dollars per ton)

% Increase in
Switchgrass Price

Biorefinery’s Profit*
(in thousand dollars)

WDFP

151

4.1

-3.9

WDLU

139

4.2

36.2

MDSU

79

2.3

234.3

PDFP

96

2.5

136.4

* Discounted five-year profit from a contract on 133 acres of land

5.5

Post Contract Risk Analysis

5.5.1 Switchgrass Yield Risk under the Capacity Procurement Contract
After the farmers accept the switchgrass procurement contract, both the farmers and the
biorefinery go into the post contract stage, in which the farmers will grow switchgrass and
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provide the harvested switchgrass to the biorefinery for ethanol production. Assuming the CPC
price to be CPC , the biorefinery’s profit from each contract can be derived from the equation
(51), which is,
(68)

 E(S (t ))  OMC  s  m  L  
T

t 1

0

CPC

L e rt dt

And the farmer’s overall profit during the contract lifespan can also be calculated to be
(69)

 
T

0

CPC

  t c1 1 L e rt dt

After the contract has been signed, neither the farmers nor the biorefinery can alter the
switchgrass contract price under either the capacity procurement contract or the acreage contract.
If the switchgrass yield  1 were to decrease, under a capacity procurement contract, the
biorefinery’s profit will decrease because the biorefinery will have less feedstock supply to
produce ethanol (equation (68)). The biorefinery’s total revenue decreases while costs remain
relatively constant. The farmers’ profit, however, will increase following the switchgrass yield
decrease (equation (69)). The switchgrass capacity procurement contract has locked the price
paid to the farmers on the farmers’ entire land. When the switchgrass yield decreases
unexpectedly during the contract lifespan, the farmer’s cost on switchgrass production will
decrease accordingly. Therefore, the farmer’s switchgrass production profit will increase. The
impact of a 10% unexpected decrease in switchgrass yield on the biorefinery’s profit and
farmer’s profit during the CPC lifespan is shown in Table 25. On the other hand, when the
switchgrass yield is unexpectedly high during the switchgrass CPC lifespan, the biorefinery’s
profit will increase accordingly from equation (68) because the biorefinery then has more
feedstock supply and therefore more ethanol production. However, the farmers’ profit will
suffer a decrease due to the fact that the switchgrass selling price has been locked at a low level
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and the total production cost increases. In both cases the biorefinery and the farmers’ profit will
be affected by the unexpected switchgrass yield change under a capacity procurement contract
but the biorefinery will be affected to a larger extent (Table 25).

Table 25 Impact of 10% Decrease in Switchgrass Yield on the Biorefinery’s and the
Farmer’s Profit at Post CPC Contract Stage
Contract Price
(dollars per acre)

% Decrease in
Biorefinery’s
Profit*

% Increase in
Farmer’s Profit

WDFP

795

320.8

5.8

WDLU

792

88.3

5.7

MDSU

474

20.5

18.4

PDFP

442

26.5

16.5

Landscapes

Traditional Cropland

Marginal Land
* Discounted five-year profit from a contract on 133 acres of land

5.5.2 Switchgrass Yield Risk under the Tonnage Contract
If the TC price is assumed to be TC , the biorefinery’s profit from each contract can be
derived from the equation (64), which is,
(70)

 E(S (t ))  OMC  s  m  L  
T

t 1

0

 t  1L ert dt

TC

And the farmer’s overall profit without taking the opportunity cost on corn production during the
contract lifespan can also be calculated to be
(71)

 
T

0

TC

 c1  t  1L e rt dt
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Faced with the given tonnage contract price, both the farmer’s and the biorefinery’s profit
will be affected by the unexpected switchgrass yield change. For example, when the switchgrass
yield decreases unexpectedly during the contract lifespan, the biorefinery’s profit will decrease
accordingly (equation (70)), and the farmers’ profit will also decrease following the decrease in
switchgrass yield. The biorefinery’s profit decreases because the revenue decrease from ethanol
production is larger than the switchgrass procurement cost decrease. The farmers’ profit will
decrease because the contract price only guarantees a per unit price of switchgrass; therefore,
when the switchgrass yield decreases, the total revenue will also decrease. Table 26 shows the
percentage decreases in both the farmers’ and the biorefinery’s profits following the unexpected
decrease in switchgrass yield during the contract lifespan. The biorefinery’s profit change and
the farmers’ profit percentage change will be the same as the switchgrass yield’s percentage
change. And the biorefinery’s profit will change in a smaller percentage under the tonnage
contract compared the percentage change in the biorefinery’s profit change under the capacity
procurement contract (Table 25 and Table 26). This reveals that the biorefinery will be more
willing to use the tonnage contract compared to the capacity procurement contract considering
the post contract risks. In most landscapes (WDFP, MDSU, and PDFP), the farmers’ profit risk
with regard to the switchgrass yield change will also be smaller under the tonnage contract.
However, the effects of the switchgrass yield change on farmers’ profit change are opposite
between the capacity procurement contract and the tonnage contract. When the switchgrass yield
increases, both the biorefinery’s and the farmers’ profits will increase accordingly.
When the contractual relationship has been built between the biorefinery and the farmers,
a potential risk also comes from the alternative land usage. If the corn price or the corn yield
increases unexpectedly, the farmer has to give up more to produce switchgrass. However, from
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equation (68) and (70), the biorefinery’s profit will not be affected by the corn production once
the contract price has been specified under both the capacity procurement contract and the
tonnage contract. Therefore, only the farmers are faced with the risks from corn production
returns.

Table 26 Impact of 10% Decrease in Switchgrass Yield on the Biorefinery’s and the
Farmer’s Profit at Post TC Contract Stage
Contract Price
(dollars per ton)

% Decrease in
Biorefinery’s
Profit*

% Decrease in
Farmer’s Profit

WDFP

145

10

10

WDLU

133

10

10

MDSU

77

10

10

PDFP

93

10

10

Landscapes

Traditional Cropland

Marginal Land
* Discounted five-year profit from a contract on 133 acres of land

Comparing Table 25 and Table 26, the biorefinery will be more willing to use a tonnage
contract compared to a capacity procurement contract. For example, on MDSU land, the
biorefinery’s profit from each contract under a tonnage contract is the same as the estimated
profit under a capacity procurement contract. However, the biorefinery is subject to a higher risk
with regard to the switchgrass yield under the capacity procurement contract. Under the capacity
procurement contract, the biorefinery pays the farmers a fixed amount of money based on the
acres farmers used for planting switchgrass no matter how much switchgrass can be harvested
that year. On MDSU lands, the biorefinery pays each farmer $474 for each acre of land planted
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to switchgrass. However, in the first year, the yield of switchgrass will only be 14% of the
maximum yield level. Therefore, in the first year, the biorefinery may very well lose money
from ethanol production because the supply of the switchgrass is too low. In contrast, under the
tonnage contract, the switchgrass is paid by each ton of switchgrass harvested. Therefore, in the
first year, when the switchgrass yield is low, the biorefinery’s expenditure on switchgrass in the
first year is also low, which means that the biorefinery can adjust the procurement cost based on
the switchgrass harvest condition. And the biorefinery therefore is not necessarily losing money
in the first year. The overall risk faced by the biorefinery within the contract lifespan will thus
be higher under the capacity procurement contract compared to the tonnage contract.
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CHAPTER VI
CONCLUSION

The on-farm production of biomass for ethanol production has been given more and more
attention from farmers, policymakers and others. Switchgrass has been identified as one of the
most promising biomass feedstocks to be used to produce cellulosic ethanol. Compared to
traditional crops, switchgrass can be grown on various landscapes, including marginal lands.
Much research has been done with regard to the economic feasibility of producing switchgrass.
Most of the research focuses on the estimation of production costs or the breakeven prices. The
breakeven prices of switchgrass range from $46 to $94 per ton based on different environments
where it is grown. However, because the biomass market is not developed yet, the market price
of switchgrass has not been given much attention.
In this thesis, a model is built combining both the biorefinery and the farmers in a
contractual relationship. Two procurement contract types have been discussed: the capacity
procurement contract and the tonnage contract. In a capacity procurement contract, the
biorefinery pays the farmers a fixed price for each acre of land allocated towards switchgrass
production. In a tonnage contract, the biorefinery pays the farmer a price for each ton of
switchgrass harvested. Both the supply side and the demand side for switchgrass are considered.
Corn is considered as an alternative crop for the farmers. Because the switchgrass procurement
contract covers the expectation of the biorefinery and the farmers for the next five years, the
expected ethanol price and corn price for years 2014 through 2018 have been estimated using
historical futures prices.
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Land quality and soil types also affect the yields and average costs of switchgrass
production and corn production. Therefore, the types of landscapes also affect the contract price
of switchgrass. Using west Tennessee as a case study, the contract prices under four types of
landscapes are investigated based on Boyer et al. (2012): (i) a well-drained level upland
(WDLU), (ii) a well- to moderately well-drained floodplain (WDFP), (iii) a moderate to
somewhat poorly drained eroded sloping upland (MDSU), (iv) a poorly drained floodplain
(PDFP).
For the capacity procurement contract, the farm-gate switchgrass contract prices are
$795, $792, $474, and $442 per acre for the switchgrass grown on WDLU, WDFP, MDSU and
PDFP lands respectively. Under the tonnage contract, the prices are $145, $133, $77, and $93
per ton for the switchgrass grown on WDLU, WDFP, MDSU, and PDFP respectively. The large
price differences between the switchgrass grown on traditional croplands (WDLU and WDFP)
and marginal lands (MDSU and PDFP) are largely due to the high yields and high recent market
price of corn as an alternative crop that could be grown in place of switchgrass. To maximize
the profit, the biorefinery will prefer to sign contracts with the farmers growing switchgrass on
marginal lands. MDSU land is their top choice.
Sensitivity analysis is conducted on the capacity procurement contract prices and the
tonnage contract prices on four aspects: corn price prediction, switchgrass yield prediction, corn
yield prediction, and farmers’ discount rate. The result reveals that a lower corn price and a
lower corn yield will cause the CPC and TC prices to be lower, because the farmers’ corn profit
will be lower following the decrease in corn price and yield prediction. A higher farmers’
discount rate will cause the CPC and TC prices to be higher, because the farmers will require
more compensation following the higher risk perception in the switchgrass production contract.
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Under the capacity procurement contract, a higher switchgrass yield will cause the per acre
contract price to be higher, because the switchgrass production costs will be higher. On the other
hand, under the tonnage contract, the per ton contract price will be lower when the switchgrass
yield is higher because the farmers do not need as much profit per ton to keep the switchgrass
profit equal to that from corn production. In total, corn price and corn yield predictions have a
higher impact on switchgrass contract prices compared to impact from switchgrass yield and
farmers’ discount rate.
Post contract sensitivity analysis with regard to a change in switchgrass yield or a change
in corn price is also conducted in this study. It reveals that a tonnage contract is preferred by the
biorefinery compared to the capacity procurement contract. The tonnage contract has more post
contract risk advantage than the capacity procurement contract with regard to the unexpected
change in switchgrass yield.
It is hard to project the corn price and ethanol price for a long time range, such as 10
years. A 5-year contract is discussed in this thesis. The impact of economies of scale for both
the farmers and the biorefinery can be considered in future studies. Changes in technology will
also affect the profitability of the biorefinery. Transportation costs could be used as variable
based on distance. In this study, switchgrass dry matter loses in transportation and storage were
not considered as a function of either type of switchgrass bale or type of storage used. Future
research can also incorporate other alternative land uses besides corn production. Soybeans,
cotton, hay, and livestock can be considered as the alternative choices for the farmers. It will
refine the farmers’ decision process if more alternatives are considered.

92

REFERENCES

93

Aden, M.R., K. Ibsen, J. Jechura, K. Neeves, J. Sheehan, B. Wallace, L. Montague, A. Slayton,
and J. Lukas. 2002. “Lingnocellulosic Biomass to Ethanol Process Design and
Economics Utilizing Co-Current Dilute Acid Prehydrolysis and Enzymatic Hydrolysis
for Corn Stover.” Golden, CO, Department of Energy: 154.
Allen, F.L., R. Johhson, R.C. Williams, Jr., and A.T. McClure. 2007-2012. “Corn Grain Hybrid
Tests in Tennessee 2012.” Agronomic Crop Variety Testing and Demonstrations.
Department of Plant Sciences, University of Tennessee, Knoxville. Online access:
http://www.utcrops.com/corn/corn_images/Corn%20Grain%20Hybrid%20Tests%20in%
20Tennessee%202012%20-%20for%20web%20posts.pdf (accessed on March 3, 2013).
Anderson, S.T. 2010. “The Demand for Ethanol as a Gasoline Substitute.” Working paper for
National Bureau of Economic Research. Available at:
http://www.nber.org/papers/w16371.
Banse, M., H. van Meijl, A. Tabeau, and G. Woltjer. 2008. “Will EU Biofuel Policies Affect
Global Agricultural Markets?” European Review of Agricultural Economics 35 (2):117–
141.
Bjerksund, P. 1991. “Contingent Claims Evaluation When the Convenience Yield Is Stochastic:
Analytical Results.” Working paper, Norwegian School of Economics and Business
Administration.
Bjerksund, P., and S. Ekern. 1990. “Managing Investment Opportunities under Price
Uncertainty: From ‘Last Chance’ to ‘Wait and See’ Strategies.” Financial Management
19(3): 65-83.
Bouton, J. 2002. “Bioenergy Crop Breeding and Production Research in The Southeast Final
Report For 1996 To 2001.” University of Georgia, Athens, Georgia, December.

94

Box, G.E., G.M. Jenkins, and G.C. Reinsel. 2008. Time Series Analysis: Forecasting and
Control, 4th edition. New Jersey: John Wiley & Sons, Inc.
Boyer, C.N., D.D. Tyler, R.K. Roberts, B.C. English, and J.A. Larson. 2012. “Switchgrass
Yield Response Functions and Profit-Maximizing Nitrogen Rates on Four Landscapes in
Tennessee.” Agronomy Journal 104(6): 1579-1588.
Bransby, D.I. 1998. “Interest Among Alabama Farmers in Growing Switchgrass for Energy.”
Paper presented at BioEnergy ’98: Expanding Bioenergy Partnerships, Madison,
Wisconsin, October 4-8, 1998.
Brennan, M.J., and E.S. Schwartz. 1985. “Evaluating Natural Resource Investments.” The
Journal of Business 58(2): 135-157.
Brockwell, P.J., and R.A. Davis. 2002. Introduction to Time Series and Forecasting, 2nd
edition. New York: Springer Science+Business Media, Inc.
Cachon, G.P., and M.A. Lariviere. 2001. “Contracting to Assure Supply: How to Share
Demand Forecast in a Supply Chain.” Management Science 47(5): 629-646.
Carolan, J.E., S.V. Joshi, and B.E. Dale. 2007. “Technical and Financial Feasibility Analysis of
Distributed Bioprocessing Using Regional Biomass Pre-Processing Centers.” Journal of
Agricultural and Food Industrial Organization 5(2), Article 10.
Chow, G.C. 1979. “Optimum Control of Stochastic Differential Equation Systems.” Journal of
Economic Dynamics and Control 1: 143-175.
Covert, C. and B.C. English. 2012. “Biofuel Reserve Accounting.” Working paper, Department
of Agricultural and Resource Economics, University of Tennessee, Knoxville.
Cox, J.C., J.E. Ingersoll, and S.A. Ross. 1985. “A Theory of the Term Structure of Interest
Rates.” Econometrica 53(2): 385-407.

95

Cundiff, J.S. and L.S. Marsh. 1996. “Harvest and Storage Costs for Bales of Switchgrass in the
Southeastern United States.” Bioresource Technology 56: 95-101.
Cundiff, J.S. and R.D. Grisso. 2008. “Containerized Handling to Minimize Hauling Cost of
Herbaceous Biomass.” Biomass and Bioenergy 32: 308-313.
Davis, C. and J. Gillespie. 2007. “Factors Affecting the Selection of Business Arrangements by
U.S. Hog Farmers.” Review of Agricultural Economics 29 (2): 331–348.
De La Torre Ugarte, D.G., and B.C. English, and K. Jensen. 2007. “Sixty Billion Gallons by
2030: Economic and Agricultural Impacts of Ethanol and Biodiesel Expansion.”
Principal paper session Challenges and Policy Implications of Developing An
Economically Competitive Bioenergy Production System with Cellulosic Feedstock, 2007
Joint Annual Meeting of the AAEA, WAEA, and CAES, Portland, Oregon, July 29August 1, 2007.
Dicks, M.R., J. Campiche, D. De La Torre Ugarte, C. Hellwinckel, H.L. Bryant, and J.W.
Richardson. 2009. “Land Use Implications of Expanding Biofuel Demand.” Journal of
Agricultural and Applied Economics 41: 435–453.
Dong,F., D. Hennessy, and H. Jensen. 2008. “Contract and Exit Decisions in Finisher Hog
Production.” Working Paper 08-WP 469. Center for Agricultural and Rural
Development Iowa State University.
Duer, H. and P.O. Christensen. 2010. “Socio-Economic Aspects of Different Biofuel
Development Pathways.” Biomass and Bioenergy 34: 237-243.
Dufﬁe, D. 1992. Dynamic Asset Pricing Theory. New Jersey: Princeton University Press.
Duffy, M., and V.Y. Nanhou. 2001. “Costs of Producing Switchgrass for Biomass in Southern
Iowa.” Iowa State University: University Extension, April.

96

Duffy, M. 2007. “Estimated Costs for Production, Storage and Transportation of Switchgrass.”
Publication No. PM 2042. Iowa State University Extension.
Durbin, J., and S.J. Koopman. 2012. Time Series Analysis by State Space Methods, 2nd edition.
Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Edleman, P. 2006. “Farm Characteristics of Contract Specialty Grain Producers.” Journal of
Sustainable Agriculture 29 (1): 95-117.
Eggeman, T., R.T. Elander. 2005. “Process and Economic Analysis of Pretreatment
Technologies.” Bioresource Technology 96: 2019-2025.
Elliot, R.J., and P.E. Kopp. 2005. Mathematics of Financial Markets, 2nd edition. New York:
Springer Science+Business Media, Inc.
English, B.C., D.G. De La Torre Ugarte, M.E. Walsh, C. Hellwinckel, and J. Menard. 2006.
“Economic Competitiveness of Bioenergy Production and Effects on Agriculture of the
Southern Region.” Journal of Agricultural and Applied Economics 38: 389–402.
English, B.C., J.A. Larson and D. Mooney. 2008. “Switchgrass Harvest and Storage Costs and
Bale Quality.” Milan No-Till Field Day, July 24. Milan, Tennessee.
English, B.C., J. Menard, K. Jensen, C. Hellwinckel, and D. De La Torre Ugarte. 2011. “25%
Renewable Energy for the United States by 2025: An Analysis on Jobs Created By
Meting This Goal.” Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics, University of
Tennessee, Knoxville. Downloadable at:
http://beag.ag.utk.edu/25x25/JobsVersion7.pdf?v=2&c=2YIGg+PdE6KaQCW1USmUm
GC5y6giMmmo.

97

Epplin, F.M., C. D. Clark, R.K. Roberts, and S. Hwang. 2007. “Challenges to the Development
of a Dedicated Energy Crop.” American Journal of Agricultural Economics 89 (5):
1296-1302.
Fabozzi, F., F.P. Modigliani, and F. Jones. 2009. Foundations of Financial Markets and
Institutions. 4th edition. New Jersey: Prentice Hall, Inc.
Fama, E.F., and K.R. French. 1988. “Business Cycles and the Behavior of Metals Prices.” The
Journal of Finance 43(5): 1075-1093.
Fewell, J., J. Bergtold, and J. Williams. 2011. “Farmers’ Willingness to Grow Switchgrass as a
Cellulosic Bioenergy Crop: A Stated Choice Approach.” Selected paper prepared for
presentation at the 2011 Joint Annual Meeting of the Canadian Agricultural Economics
Society & Western Agricultural Economics Association, Banff, Alberta, Canada, June
29-July 1, 2011.
Fike, J., D. Parrish, D. Wolf, J. Balasko, J. Green, Jr., M. Rasnake, and J. Reynolds. 2006.
“Switchgrass Production for the Upper Southeastern USA: Influence of Cultivar and
Cutting Frequency on Biomass Yields.” Biomass and Bioenergy 30: 207–213.
Food and Agricultural Policy Research Institute (FAPRI). 2013. “U.S. Baseline Briefing Book:
Projections for Agricultural and Biofuel Markets.” FAPRI-MU Report #01-13. Online
access:
http://www.fapri.missouri.edu/outreach/publications/2013/FAPRI_MU_Report_01_13.pd
f (accessed on April 10, 2013).
Franken, J., R. Joost, M. Pennings, and P. Garcia. 2009. “Do Transaction Costs and Risk
Preferences Influence Marketing Arrangements in the Illinois Hog Industry?” Journal of
Agricultural and Resource Economics 34(2): 297-315.

98

Fuentes, R.G., and C.M. Taliaferro. 2002. “Biomass Yield Stability of Switchgrass Cultivars.”
In J. Janick and A. Whipkey, eds. Trends in New Crops and New Uses. Alexandria VA:
ASHS Press, pp. 276–82.
Garland, C. 2008. “Growing and Harvesting Switchgrass for Ethanol Production in Tennessee.”
Publication No. SP701-A. University of Tennessee Extension.
Gibson, R., and E. S. Schwartz. 1990. “Stochastic Convenience Yield and the Pricing of Oil
Contingent Claims”. Journal of Finance 45: 959-976.
Ginder, R.G., D. Artz, H. Hommes, J. Cashman, and H. Holden. 2000. “Output Trait Specialty
Corn Production in Iowa.” Iowa State University Extension Publicaion.
Griffith, A.P., J.A. Larson, B.C. English, and D.L. McLemore. 2012. “Analysis of Contracting
Alternatives for Switchgrass as a Production Alternative on an East Tennessee Beef and
Crop Farm.” AgBioForum 15(2): 206-216.
Goldemberg, J. 2007. “Ethanol for a Sustainable Energy Future.” Science 315: 808-810.
Goodhue, R.E. 2000. “Broiler Production Contracts as a Multi-Agent Problem: Incentives,
Common Risk and Heterogeneity.” American Journal of Agricultural Economics 82(3):
606-622.
Hamelinck, C., G. van Hooijdonk, and A. Faaij. 2005. “Ethanol from Lignocellulosic Biomass:
Techno-Economic Performance in Short-, Middle- and Long-term.” Biomass and
Bioenergy 28: 384-410.
Hamilton, J. 1994. Time Series Analysis. New Jersey: Princeton University Press.
Hamilton, J. 1994. “State Space Models.” Handbook of Econometrics, Volume IV.

99

Haque, M., and F. Epplin. 2012. “Cost to Produce Switchgrass and Cost to Produce Ethanol
from Switchgrass for Several Levels of Biorefinery Investment Cost and Biomass to
Ethanol Conversion Rates.” Biomass and Bioenergy 46: 517-530.
Harvey, A.C. 1989. Forecasting, Structural Time Series Models and the Kalman Filter.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Howitt, R.E. 1995. “Positive Mathematical Programming.” American Journal of Agricultural
Economics 77(2): 329-342.
Humbird, D., R. Davis, L. Tao, C. Kinchin, D. Hsu, A. Aden, P. Schoen, J. Lukas, B. Olthof, M.
Worley, D. Sexton, and D. Dudgeon. 2011. “Process Design and Economics for
Biochemical Conversion of Lignocellulosic Biomass to Ethanol: Dilute-Acid
Pretreatment and Enzymatic Hydrolysis of Corn Stover.” Golden, CO: U.S. Department
of Energy National Renewable Energy Laboratory; Technical Report NREL/TP-510047764.
Iogen Corporation. (n.d.) http://www.iogen.ca/ (accessed April 9, 2012).
Jensen, K., C.D. Clark, P. Ellis, B. English, J Menard, M. Walsh, and D. de la Torre Ugarte.
2007. “Farmer Willingness to Grow Switchgrass for Energy Production.” Biomass and
Bioenergy 31(2007): 773-781.
Jensen, K., C.D. Clark, B.C. English, and R.J. Menard. 2011. “Preferences for Marketing
Arrangements by Potential Switchgrass Growers.” Journal of Cooperatives 25: 16-43.
Kamien, M.I., and N.L. Schwartz. 1991. Dynamic Optimization: The Calculus of Variations
and Optimal Control in Economics and Management, 2nd.ed. New York: Elsevier
Science Publishing Co., Inc.

100

Kaylen M., D. L. Van Dyne, Y. Choi, M. Blasé. 2000. “Economic Feasibility of Producing
Ethanol from Lignocellulosic Feedstocks.” Bioresource Technology 72: 19-32.
Kazi, F., K. Joshua, A. Fortman, R.P. Anex, D.D. Hsu, A. Aden, A. Dutta, and G.
Kothandaraman. 2010. “Techno-Economic Comparison of Process Technologies for
Biochemical Ethanol Production from Corn Stover.” Fuel 89: S20-S28.
Khanna, M., B. Dhungana, and J. Clifton-Brown. 2008. “Cost of Producing Miscanthus and
Switchgrass for Bioenergy in Illinois.” Biomass and Bioenergy 32: 482-493.
Laffont, J-J., and D. Martimort. 2001. The Theory of Incentives: The Principal-Agent Model.
Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Laffont, J-J., and J. Tirole. 1993. A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation.
Cambridge: The MIT Press.
Lajili, K., P.J. Berry, S.T. Sonka, and J.T. Mahoney. 1997. “Farmers’ Preferences for Crop
Contracts.” Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics 22(2): 264-280.
Larson, J.A., B.C. English, and L. He. 2008. “Risk and Return for Bioenergy Crops under
Alternative Contracting Arrangements.” Selected paper prepared for presentation at the
Southern Agricultural Economics Association Annual Meetings, Dallas, Texas, February
2-6, 2008.
Larson, J.A., B.C. English, C. Hellwinkel, D. de la Torre Ugarte, and M. Walsh. 2005. “A
Farm-Level Evaluation of Conditions under Which Farmers Will Supply Biomass
Feedstocks for Energy Production.” Selected paper prepared for presentation at the
American Agricultural Economics Association Annual Meeting, Providence, Rhode
Island, July 24-27, 2005.

101

Maposse, I., D. Bransby, S. Sladden, and D. Kee. 1995. “Biomass Yields from Eight
Switchgrass Varieties in Alabama.” Agronomy Abstracts. Madison, Wisconsin: ASA,
pp.138.
Mark, T., P. Darby, and M. Salassi. 2009. “A Comparison of Pricing Strategies for Cellulosic
Ethanol Processors: A Simulation Approach.” Selected paper prepared for presentation
at the American Agricultural Economics Association Annual Meetings, Milwaukee,
Wisconsin, July 26-28, 2009.
McKinley, T.L., and D.C. Gerloff. 2013. “Field Crop Budgets for 2013”. The University of
Tennessee Extension AE13-07. Online access:
http://economics.ag.utk.edu/budgets/2013/CropBudgets2013.pdf (accessed on April 18,
2013).
McLaughlin, S., and L. Kszos. 2005. “Development of Switchgrass (Panicum Virgatum) as a
Bioenergy Feedstock in the United States.” Biomass and Bioenergy 28: 515-535.
McLaughlin, S., J. Bouton, D. Bransby, B. Conger, W. Ocumpaugh, D. Parrish, C. Taliaferro, K.
Vogel, and S. Wullschleger. 1999. “Developing Switchgrass as a Bioenergy Crop.”
Perspectives on New Crops and New Uses, pp.282-299.
Mooney, D.F., R.K. Roberts, B.C. English, D.D. Tyler, and J.A. Larson. 2009. “Yield and
Breakeven Price of ‘Alamo’ Switchgrass for Biofuels in Tennessee.” Agronomy Journal
101: 1234-1242.
Muir, J., M. Sanderson, W. Ocumpaugh, R. Jones, and R. Reed. 2001. “Biomass Production of
‘Alamo’ Switchgrass in response to Nitrogen, Phosphorus, and Row Spacing.”
Agronomy Journal 93: 896–901.

102

Pacini, H., and S. Silveira. 2010. “Gasoline Pricing Systems and the Attractiveness of HighEthanol Blends: The Cases of Brazil and Sweden.” Work presented at the 3rd
International Scientific Conference on Energy Systems with IT, part of the Swedish
Energitinget, Stockholmsmässan, Älvsjö, Sweden, March 16-17, 2010.
Paulson, N.D., and B.A. Babcock. 2007. “The Effects of Uncertainty and Contract Structure in
Specialty Grain Markets.” Selected paper presented at the American Agricultural
Economics Association Annual Meeting, Portland Oregon, July 29-August 1, 2007.
Perlack, R.D., L.L. Wright, A.F. Turhollow, R.L. Graham, B.J. Stokes, and D.C. Erbach. 2005.
Biomass as Feedstock for a Bioenergy and Bioproducts Industry: The Technical
Feasibility of a Billion-Ton Annual Supply. Washington DC: U.S. Department of
Agriculture, U.S. Department of Energy.
Perrin, R., K. Vogel, M. Schmer, and R. Mitchell. 2008. “Farm-Scale Production Cost of
Switchgrass for Biomass.” Bioenergy Resource 1: 91-97.
Petrulis, M., J. Sommer, and F. Hines. 1993. “Ethanol Production and Employment.” USDA
Agricultural Research Service. Agricultural Information Bulletin, Number 678.
Pimentel, D., and T. Patzek. 2005. “Ethanol Production Using Corn, Switchgrass, and Wood;
Biodiesel Production Using Soybean and Sunflower.” Natural Resources Research
14(1): 65-75.
Pindyck, R.S. 1980. “Uncertainty and Exhaustible Resource Markets.” Journal of Political
Economy 88(6): 1203-1225.
Salanie, B. 1997. The Economics of Contracts: A Primer. Cambridge: The MIT Press.
Sanderson, M.A., R.P. Egg, and A.E. Wiselogel. 1997. “Biomass Losses during Harvest and
Storage of Switchgrass.” Biomass and Bioenergy 12(2): 107-114.

103

Sanderson, M.A., P.R. Adler, A.A. Boateng, M.D. Casler, and G. Sarath. 2006. “Switchgrass as
a Biofuels Feedstock in the USA.” Canadian Journal of Plant Science 86: 1315-1325.
Schemer, M.R., K.P. Vogel, R.B. Mitchell, and R.K. Perrin. 2007. “Net Energy of Cellulosic
Ethanol from Switchgrass.” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences (PNAS)
105(2): 464-469.
Schwartz, E.S. 1997. “The Stochastic Behavior of Commodity Prices: Implications for
Valuation and Hedging.” The Journal of Finance 52(3): 923-973.
Schwartz, E.S., and J.E. Smith. 2000. “Short-Term Variations and Long-Term Dynamics in
Commodity Prices.” Management Science 46 (7): 893-911.
Sendich, E.N., M. Laser, S. Kim, H. Alizadeh, L. Laureano-Perez, B. Dale, and L. Lynd. 2008.
“Recent Process Improvements for the Ammonia Fiber Expansion (Afex) Process and
Resulting Reductions in Minimum Ethanol Selling Price.” Bioresource Technology 99:
8429-8435.
Shreve, S.E. 2004. Stochastic Calculus for Finance II: Continuous-Time Models. New York:
Springer Science+Business Media, Inc.
Sun, Y., and J. Cheng. 2002. “Hydrolysis of Lignocellulosic Materials for Ethanol Production:
A Review.” Bioresource Technology 83(1): 1-11.
Treguer, D., J.-C. Sourie, and S. Rozakis. 2005. “Questions of Costs about the French Bio-fuel
Sector by Year 2010.” Paper prepared for presentation at the XIth International Congress
of the EAAE (European Association of Agricultural Economists), “The Future of Rural
Europe in the Global Agri-Food System”, Copenhagen, Denmark, August 24-27, 2005.
Tyner, W.E. 2008. “The US Ethanol and Biofuels Boom: Its Origins, Current Status, and Future
Prospects.” BioScience 58(7): 646-653.

104

Varvel, G.E., K.P. Vogel, R.B. Mitchell, R.F. Follett, and J.M. Kimble. 2008. “Comparison of
Corn and Switchgrass on Marginal Soils for Biorefinery.” Biomass and Bioenergy 32:
18-21.
Walsh, M. 1998. “US Bioenergy Crop Economic Analysis: Status and Needs.” Biomass and
Bioenergy 14: 341-350.
Walsh, M., D.G. De La Torre Ugarte, H. Shapouri, and S.P. Slinsky. 2003. “Bioenergy Crop
Production in the United States.” Environmental and Resource Economics 24: 313-333.
Wang, C., J.A. Larson, B.C. English, and K. Jensen. 2009. “Cost Analysis of Alternative
Harvest, Storage, and Transportation Methods for Delivering Switchgrass to a
Biorefinery from the Farmer’s Perspective.” Paper presented at Southern Agricultural
Economics Association Annual Meeting, Atlanta, GA, January 31-February 3.
Weleschuk, I.T., and W.A. Kerr. 1995. “The Sharing of Risks and Returns in Prairie Special
Crops: A Transaction Cost Approach.” Canadian Journal of Agricultural Economics
89(1): 1-29.
West, M., and J. Harrison. 1997. Bayesian Forecasting and Dynamic Models, 2nd edition. New
York: Springer-Verlag New York, Inc.
White, H. 1982. “Maximum Likelihood Estimation of Misspecified Models.” Econometrica
50(1): 1–25.
Williams, J. 1987. “Futures Markets: A Consequence of Risk Aversion or Transactions Costs?”
Journal of Political Economy 95(5): 1000-1023.
Wingren, A., M. Galbe, and G. Zacchi. 2003. “Techno-Economic Evaluation of Producing
Ethanol from Softwood: Comparison of SSF and SHF and Identification of Bottlenecks.”
Biotechnological Progress 19: 1109-1117.

105

Wingren, A., J. Soderstrom , M. Galbe, and G. Zacchi. 2004. “Process Considerations and
Economic Evaluation of Two-Step Steam Pretreatment for Production of Fuel Ethanol
from Softwood.” Biotechnological Progress 20: 1421-1429.
Working, H. 1949. “The Theory of Price of Storage.” The American Economic Review 39(6):
1254-1262.
Wu, J., M. Sperow, and J. Wang. 2010. “Economic Feasibility of a Woody Biomass-Based
Ethanol Plant in Central Appalachia.” Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics
35(3): 522–544.
Wyman, C. 1993. “Cellulosic Biomass Conversion Technology and Its Application to Ethanol
Production from Corn.” Fuel Reformulation, March/April: 67-74.
Yang, X., N. Paulson, and M. Khanna. 2012. “Optimal Contracts to Induce Biomass Production
under Risk.” Selected paper prepared for presentation at the Agricultural and Applied
Economics Association’s 2012 AAEA&NAREA Joint Annual Meeting. Seattle, WA,
August 12-14.
Young, C.E., and P.C. Westcott. 2000. “How Decoupled is U.S. Agricultural Support for Major
Crops?” American Journal of Agricultural Economics 82: 762-767.

106

APPENDIX

107

A.1

Schwartz (1997) Two-Factor Model
Based on the Efficient Market theory proposed by Fama (1965), the commodity price can

be assumed having incorporated all the available information by that time. Assume the
commodity spot price of commodity ( ) follows the stochastic process (Gibson and Schwartz
1990; Schwartz 1997):

dS  (   )Sdt  1Sdz1

(A.1.1)

where  denotes the long run log price,  1 is the volatility term, and dz1 describes a Brownian
motion.  denotes the instantaneous convenience yield (cost-of-carry) which can be interpreted
as the flow of services accruing to the holder of the commodity sellers but not to the holder of a
futures contract. Fabozzi et al. (2009) explained the convenience yield as:
“… It is in the futures market that investors send a collective message about how any new
information is expected to impact the cash market. … the futures price and the cash
market are tied together by the cost of carry. If the futures price deviates from the cash
market price by more than the cost of carry, arbitrageurs … would pursue a strategy to
bring them back into line. Arbitrage is the mechanism that assures that the cash market
price will reflect the information that has been collected in the futures market.” (Fabozzi
et al. 2009)
The convenience yield is defined to be “the flow of services which accrue to the owner of
a physical inventory but not to the owner of a contract for future delivery” by Brennan (1991). It
is also assumed to follow a stochastic process:
(A.1.2)

d   (   )dt   2dz2

where  denotes the speed of mean reversion to the long run mean log price  ,  2 is the
volatility term, and dz 2 describes a Brownian motion. Furthermore, assume
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dz1dz2  dt

(A.1.3)

The change in commodity convenience yield d has two components: a systematic
change  (   )dt and a random change  2 dz2 . The systematic percentage change in
commodity price is the change that can be predicted from the current commodity price which is
negatively related to the current commodity price. This inverse relationship between the future
price expectation and current price level is the “mean-reverting” property. The second term in
equations (A.1.1) and (A.1.2) represents the random change in commodity price. The Brownian
motion accounts for all the unavailable information and unknown factors in commodity futures
price determination. The randomness comes from Brownian motion’s property that unexpected
change in future commodity price and convenience yield is independent of the price change at
any earlier time.
Defining X  log( S ) , and applying Itō’s lemma12,

dX 

X
X
2 X
dt 
dS  2 dSdS
t
S
S



1
1 1
dS   2 dSdS
S
2 S



1
  S Sdt  1Sdz1   1 12 12 S 2dt
S
2S

1
    dt   1dz1   12 dt
2
1 

       12 dt   1dz1
2 


12

Itō's lemma is used to find the differential of a time-dependent function of a stochastic process, because
derivatives cannot be obtained from stochastic process. Let ( ) be a function for which the partial derivatives
( ), ( ), and
( ) are defined and continuous, and let ( ) be a Brownian motion. Then, for each
( ))
, (
( ( )) ∫ ( ( ))
( ( ))
. For Brownian motion
∫ ( ( ))
∫
( ),
, and
(Shreve 2004).
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Therefore, the log spot commodity price can be characterized as an Ornstein-Uhlenbeck
stochastic process13:
1 

dX        12 dt   1dz1
2 


(A.1.4)

Since convenience yield risk cannot be hedged, the risk-adjusted convenience yield process will
have a market price of risk associated with it (Schwartz 1997). Under equivalent martingale
measure, equations (A.1.1) and (A.1.2) can be rewritten as
dS  (r   )Sdt  1Sdz1

*

(A.1.5)
(A.1.6)

d   (   )   dt   2dz2

(A.1.7)

dz1 dz2  dt

*

*

*

 is the market price of risk (assumed constant) and dz1* and dz2* are the increments to the
Brownian motion under the equivalent martingale measure.
Futures prices then must satisfy the partial differential equation (Gibson and Schwartz
1990):
(A.1.8)

1 2 2
1
 1 S FSS   1 2 SFS   22 F  r   SFS         F  FT  0
2
2

subject to the terminal boundary condition F S ,  ,0  S .
Bjerksund (1991) has shown that the solution to equation (A.1.8) is
(A.1.9)



1  e T
F S , T   E S T   S exp   
 A(T ) 




Or,

13

(
)
An Ornstein–Uhlenbeck process, , satisfies the following stochastic differential equation:
, where
, and
are parameters and
denotes the Wiener process (or Brownian motion).
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(A.1.10)

log F S , T   log S  

1  eT



 A(T )

where


1  22  1 2  
1 2 1  e2T 
 22  1  eT
ˆ
ˆ
T   2

A(T )   r   

    1 2  
2 2
 
4
3
   2




ˆ    .

■
A.2

Derivation of Equations (9) and (10) (Schwartz and Smith (2000))
Let t  t / n , then equations (6) and (7) can be written as

xt  c  Qxt 1  t
where


xt   t t 

c  0 t 

 0
Q

 0 1

  1  t , and  t is a vector of serially uncorrelated, normally distributed distribution matrix
with

E (t )  0
and

  12 t
var(t )  
 1 2 t
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1 2 t 

 22 t 

Therefore, the n-step ahead mean vector mn and variance-covariance matrix Vn can be given
recursively as:

mn  c  Qmn 1 and Vn  QVn 1Q  var(t )

(A.2.1)

It can be shown that



mn   n 0 0  nt

(A.2.2)



and
 2 n 1 2i
  1 t 
i 0
Vn  
n 1
   t  i

1 2

i 0
n1

Because   i 
i 0

1   n1
and
1

n 1

  2i 
i 0

n 1



i 0





1 2 t  i 
nt

2
2

1   2( n1)
, when n approaches infinity,  n
2
1

approaches e t and  2 n approaches e 2t . Then,
n 1

(A.2.3)

t   2i 
i 0

n1
1  e 2t
1  e t
and t   i 
2

i 0

Equations (9) and (10) can be obtained by substituting (A.2.3) into (A.2.1).
■

A.3

State Space Form and Kalman Filter
In this section, only basic theory of Kalman Filter is demonstrated. More formal and

complete discussion on Kalman Filter can be found in Harvey (1989) (Chapter 3), Hamilton
(1994) (Chapter 13), Brockwell and Davis (2002) (Chapter 8), Durbin and Koopman (2012)
(Chapter 2 and 4), and West and Harrison (1997).
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A.3.1 State Space Form
The state space form describes a dynamic estimation system. Let yt be a multivariate
time series vector containing n elements. yt is observable and is related to a m  1 vector xt via
an observation equation:

yt  Zt xt  dt   t

(A.3.1)

where Z t is an n  m matrix, d t is an n  1 vector and  t is an n  1 vector of serially
uncorrelated disturbance with mean zero and covariance matrix H t , that is,

E ( t )  0 and var( t )  H t

(A.3.2)

To put equation (A.3.1) under the Gaussian process framework, assume  t is normally
distributed, that is,

 t ~ N (0, H t )

(A.3.3)

When n  1 , the observation equation (A.3.1) can be written as an univariate model:


yt  Zt xt  dt   t

(A.3.4)
where Z t is an m  1 vector, and
(A.3.5)

 t ~ N (0, ht )
In general, the unknown state vector xt is assumed to be generated via a Markov process:

(A.3.6)

xt  Tt xt 1  ct  Rtt

where Tt is an m m matrix, ct is an m  1 vector, Rt is an m  p matrix, and  t is a p  1
vector of serially uncorrelated Gaussian disturbance, that is,
(A.3.7)

t ~ N (0, Qt )

113

Equations (A.3.1) and (A.3.6) together construct the state space representation. Three
more assumptions are needed to analyze the state space model:


E ( ts )  0


E ( t x1 )  0

E (t x1 )  0
for all s, t  1, 2,, T . x1 is the initial state vector. These assumptions mean that d t provides
no more information about xt  s for s = 0, 1, … besides that contained in yt 1 , and the initial state
vector is uncorrelated with any realizations of  t and  t .

A.3.2 Kalman Filter
Consider the state space model of equations (A.3.1) and (A.3.6). Let xi | j denote the
optimal estimation of xi based on all the information up to and including y j , e.g.
xt |t  Ext | yt , yt 1, y1 
xt |t 1  Ext | yt 1 , yt  2 , y1 

Let Pi | j denote the m m covariance matrix of the estimated error based on the information set
Y j  y j , y j 1 , y1, e.g.


Pt |t  E xt  xt |t xt  xt |t  



Pt |t 1  E xt  xt |t 1 xt  xt |t 1  


When yt is available, the estimator of xt , xt |t 1 , can be updated:
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xt |t  xt |t 1  Pt |t 1Zt Ft 1 yt  Zt xt |t 1  dt 

(A.3.8)


Pt |t  Pt |t 1  Pt |t 1Zt Ft 1Zt Pt |t 1

(A.3.9)
where


Ft  Zt Pt |t 1Zt  H t

(A.3.10)

Substituting equation (A.3.8) into equation (A.3.6), the prediction of unobserved variable
in the next stage is,


xt 1|t  Tt 1 xt |t  ct 1  Tt 1  xt |t 1  Pt |t 1Zt Ft 1  yt  Zt xt |t 1  dt   ct 1


This equation can be simplified as
(A.3.11)

xt 1|t  Tt 1  Kt Zt xt |t 1  Kt yt  ct 1  Kt dt 

where
(A.3.12)


Kt  Tt 1Pt |t 1Zt Ft 1

The recursion for the covariance matrix is
(A.3.13)




Pt 1|t  Tt 1  Pt |t 1  Pt |t 1Zt Ft 1Zt Pt |t 1 Tt 1  Rt 1Qt 1Rt 1



And the prediction for yt 1 at time t is
(A.3.14)

yt 1|t  Zt 1xt 1|t  dt 1

yt 1|t can be obtained by substituting equation (A.3.11) into equation (A.3.14). The Kalman

filter is started with the unconditional mean and variance of x1 (Hamilton 1994):
(A.3.15)
(A.3.16)

x1|0  E ( x1 )


P1|0  E x1  x1|0 x1  x1|0  
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The group of equations from (A.3.8) to (A.3.16) constructs the algorithm of Kalman Filter
recursion process. The Figure 7 illustrates the process more intuitively:

Figure 7

The Recursion Process of Kalman Filter

The formal derivation of Kalman filter can be found in Harvey (1989), page 109 - 110.

A.3.3 Maximum Likelihood Estimation
The theory of maximum likelihood estimation is based on T sets of observations,
Y j  y j , y j 1 , y1. The probability density function can be written as:
T

(A.3.17)

LYt ;    P yt | Yt 1 
t 1

where  denotes all the unknown parameters involved in the state space model, and P yt | Yt 1 
denotes the probability of yt conditional on all the information received till time t  1 , Yt 1 .
Rewrite the observation equation (A.3.1) as
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yt  Zt xt |t 1  Zt xt  xt |t 1   dt   t

(A.3.18)

The conditional expected value and variance of yt at time t  1 can then be calculated from
equation (A.3.18):
(A.3.19)

Et 1  yt   yt |t 1  Zt xt |t 1  dt

(A.3.20)


vart 1  yt   Zt Pt |t 1Zt  H t  Ft

Therefore, the log likelihood function can be written as
log L  

(A.3.21)

NT
1 t
1 t 
log 2    log Ft   vt Ft 1vt
2
2 t 1
2 t 1

where vt  yt  yt |t 1 . Let
t  

(A.3.22)

N
1
1 
log2    log Ft  vt Ft 1vt
2
2
2

T

Then, log L    t . Differentiating  t with respect to the ith element of ,
t 1


 t
1 
F  1  v
F
v 


  tr  Ft 1 t    t Ft 1vt  vt Ft 1 t Ft 1vt  vt Ft 1 t 
 i
2 
 i  2   i
 i
 i 



It can be rewritten as

(A.3.23)


 t
1 
F 
  v
  tr   Ft 1 t    I  Ft 1vt vt    t Ft 1vt
  i
 i
2 
 i  


where I is the identity matrix. The first order derivative of the log likelihood function can be
obtained:

(A.3.24)



 log L
1 T 
F 
 

  v
   tr   Ft 1 t    I  Ft 1vt vt    t Ft 1vt 

 i
2 t 1   
 i  

  i
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The Maximum Likelihood Estimators can be derived while assuming

 log L
 0 , for all
 i

i  1, 2,, n . The numerical method to evaluate the parameters can be found in Harvey (1989),
Chapter 3. The gradient vector at the maximum likelihood estimates can be presented as

 log L
Gˆ 
   ˆ
The information matrix plays a very important role in calculating the covariance matrix
of maximum likelihood estimators. Differentiating the equation (A.3.23), with respect to the jth
element of  ,  j , gives,

  1 Ft 


F


t


 i  
 2 t
1  
   1  1 Ft 1 Ft 1  
1
 tr
I  Ft vt vt  tr  Ft
Ft
Ft vt vt 

  2 
 i  j 2 
 j
 i
 j









 v 
1 
F
v  
 2vt
v Ft 1
 tr  Ft 1 t Ft 1  t vt  vt t   
Ft 1vt  t
vt
2 
 i
 j
 j    i  j
 i  j





vt 1 vt

Ft
 i
 j
Therefore, the ij-th element of the information matrix can be written as
T
 2 log L
 2 t

 i  j t 1  i  j

Denoting the information matrix as H, then the information matrix at the maximum likelihood
estimates can be presented as

 2 log L
Hˆ 
   ˆ
The covariance matrix can be calculated as:
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varˆ    Hˆ 1

which is a n  n matrix. Hamilton (1994) showed that under certain conditions, quasi-maximum
likelihood estimates give consistent and asymptotically normal estimates of the true value of  ,
with
L
ˆ  

N 0, var(ˆ )

A.4

■

Derivation of Equation (54)
Substituting the expected corn price equation (35) into switchgrass price equation (52),

the switchgrass price can be written as
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which is equation (54). When T   , and     2'2  r  0 ,
2

e

rT

 0 and e

dt

1
(     2' 2  r )T
2
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0

Therefore, the switchgrass price will converge to

  c1 1  c2 2 

r 2
1
r      2'2
2
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